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Information Control in Times of Crisis: The Tools of Repression
CHRISTINA E. WELLS*
During the twentieth century the United States faced numerous threats
to national security-e.g., World War I, the Red Scare, World War H, the
Cold War, and the Vietnam War.' When responding to these crises, the
government took several steps to control information. Thus, the government
tried to (1) muster public support for its national security agenda via public
information campaigns, (2) safeguard critical information, or (3) gather
information regarding potential spies or other enemies. Such steps were
obviously legitimate in the abstract. One can hardly question the govern-
ment's right to protect itself and its citizens. The actual application of
information control, however, has been more questionable.
While there are examples of reasonable and legitimate government
actions, many government attempts to control information during national
security crises resulted in substantial and lasting abuses of civil liberties. For
example, government attempts to control public information have resulted in
unreasonable punishment of political speech or stigmatization of individuals.
Government attempts to control access to information have been used to hide
government wrongdoing rather than protect national security. Finally, govern-
ment attempts to gather information have devolved into egregious invasions
of privacy.
This article identifies several tools of information control that occur
consistently throughout history. The government does not use all of these
tools in every national security crisis. Nor does it always abuse them.
However, the patterns that emerge suggest a certain predictability to (1) the
government's actions during national security crises, and (2) the potentially
negative consequences flowing from them that warrants our attention.
Understanding this historical pattern of government action allows one to
identify and potentially prevent future problems. This is especially important
in the post-9/11 world in which the government has asked for and received
* Enoch N. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. I am
indebted to Michael Held, who provided valuable and enthusiastic research support for this article and
whose tireless and unflagging support made it better than it would have been. I also am grateful to Billie
Wells whose interest in politics and current events provided much valuable material and inspiration.
1. Although the United States has experienced other crises, this article examines prominent
twentieth century crises because commentators generally agree that World War I introduced the modern era
with respect to national security issues and because these incidents involved the most substantial judicial,
congressional, and public discussion regarding the appropriate role of government control of information.
See, e.g., Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, S. Doc. No. 105-2,
103rd Cong., A 1, A7 (1997) [hereinafter Secrecy Report]; Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline
of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1398-99 (1989).
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controversial powers with respect to information control. The current
administration's actions are eerily similar to past government actions, suggest-
ing that we should pay close attention to the government's use of specific
tools.
Section I of this article identifies an historical pattern of information
control during times of crisis. Government efforts at such control generally
fall into one of three categories-(1) attempts to control confidential informa-
tion, (2) attempts to control public information, and (3) attempts to gather
information. Although many government attempts to control information
ostensibly have claims to legitimacy, government actions in these areas have
resulted in some of the most egregious and lasting abuses in this country's
history. Section II discusses the current administration's expanded powers
with respect to information control and reveals a striking similarity between
the government's current powers and those used in past crises. Finally, this
article offers some thoughts regarding the parallels between past and present
government action.
I. HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF INFORMATION CONTROL
A. Government Control of Confidential Information
In national security crises, governments often initially resort to enhanced
secrecy with respect to national security information. This secrecy manifests
itself in several ways-the increased classification of information (i.e., the
determination that information in certain categories should not be divulged for
national security reasons), increased assertions of executive privilege, and
increased secrecy with respect to government operations generally. This
paper focuses on the classification of information as that issue pertains most
specifically to national security and because the classification system's
evolution parallels increased government secrecy generally. This section will
also occasionally discuss other issues regarding government secrecy when
relevant.
Most observers consider classification of information necessary to the
survival of the nation:
[A] government must sometimes stringently control certain informa-
tion that (1) gives the nation a significant advantage over adversaries
or (2) prevents adversaries from having an advantage that could
significantly damage the nation. Governments protect that special
information by classifying it; that is, by giving it a special designa-
tion, such as "Secret," and then restricting access to it ....
... In wartime, when a nation's survival is at stake, the reasons
for secrecy are most apparent, the secrecy restrictions imposed by the
[Vol. 30
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government are most widespread, and acceptance of those restrictions
by the citizens is broadest.
2
Typically, such classification involves information necessary to national
defense, such as information pertaining to military operations, weapons
technology, diplomatic negotiations, intelligence activities, etc.3 Viewed in
this light, classification of such information is relatively uncontroversial.4
Nevertheless, the historical pattern of government actions suggests that, while
a tilt toward secrecy is understandable, government expansion of the scope of
classified information and attempts to restrict dissemination in peacetime have
led to abuse.
During World War I, several laws restricted public dissemination of
certain information.5 The Espionage Act of 1917, the primary purpose of
which was to punish spies, enhanced existing criminal punishments for the
unlawful dissemination of information pertaining to national defense or
military secrets.6 Similarly, the Trading With the Enemy Act, the first statute
to grant presidential authority to designate information as secret, allowed the
President to control the dissemination of certain patents considered to be
"detrimental to the public safety or defense, or [which] may assist the enemy
or endanger the successful prosecution of the war ... In addition to
legislative restrictions, the American Expeditionary Forces in France also
established the first document classification system, requiring that military
2. Arvin S. Quist, Security Classifications of information, Volume 1, Introduction to Classification
1 (2002), available at http:l/www.fas.orglsgpllibrary/quistlindex.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2004)
[hereinafter Quist, Chapter 1]. See also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) ("In the instant
case we cannot escape judicial notice that this is a time of vigorous preparation for national defense...
these electronic devices must be kept secret if their full military advantage is to be exploited in the national
interests."); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-230 (1936) ("Secrecy in
respect of information gathered... may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive
of harmful results.").
3. Quist, Chapter 1, supra note 2, at 2.
4. I use the term "relatively" to acknowledge that while many people assume that the government
must maintain some secrets, some believe all such secrecy is an anathema to democratic government. See,
e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 362-63 (1973) (discussing beliefs of
Edward Teller, who was involved in developing the hydrogen bomb, that government secrecy regarding
scientific and technical information should be abolished).
5. For historical accounts of government actions pertaining to secrecy prior to World War I, see
Harold C. Relyea, The Presidency and the People's Right to Know, in THE PRESIDENCY AND INFORMATION
POLICY 1, 9-12 (Harold Relyea et al., eds. 1981); Arvin S. Quist, Security Classifications of Information,
Volume 1, Classification in the United States Prior to World War II 2-17 (2002), available at
http://www.fas.orglsgp/library/quist/index.html (last visited Aug. 11,2004) [hereinafter, Quist, Chapter 21.
6. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 219. Although there already existed penalties
for espionage, the Espionage Act significantly increased them, including imposition of the death penalty
in time of war. Quist, Chapter 2, supra note 5, at 22.
7. Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 106, § 10(i), 40 Stat. 422; see also Relyea, supra note 5, at 14.
2004]
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information be classified as "Secret," "Confidential," or "For Official Circula-
tion Only."8
Because it was narrowly confined, government secrecy during World
War I was largely uncontroversial. Legislative enactments and administrative
regulations concerned themselves with punishment of spies or military
officials deliberately leaking military or defense information to the enemy.9
Furthermore, Congress explicitly refused to give the President complete
authority regarding the designation of information subject to prosecution,
noting that to do so would raise a danger of presidential manipulation of
public opinion.' ° The Wilson administration tried to regulate dissemination
of confidential information in other ways-e.g., regulations regarding publica-
tion by the press and public--but such regulations were voluntary and not
subject to significant penalties."
President Roosevelt also acted to protect confidential information during
World War H. In 1940, pursuant to an existing statute protecting "vital
military and naval installations and equipment,"' 2 he issued Executive Order
No. 8381, the first to authorize government officials to classify documents for
national security reasons. 3 In 1942, pursuant to the First War Powers Act,
Roosevelt also issued Executive Order 9182, which gave the Office of War
Information the power to classify national security information. 14 Pursuant to
that order, the Office of War Information issued government-wide regulations
providing definitions of "Secret," "Confidential," and "Restricted" informa-
tion, designated authority to classify and guidelines for classification, and
warned against over-classification of information. 5 Although the govern
8. Relyea, supra note 5, at 12; Quist, Chapter 2, supra note 5, at 17-22.
9. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 338; Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright
Comes Home: Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 394-95
(1986).
10. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 9, at 394-95. This refusal meant that the military classification
system was merely evidence that information pertained to national defense but was not determinative of
that issue.
11. JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 95-96 (1956). One regulation, for example,
requested that the press refrain from publishing "'information, reports, or rumors, attributing a policy to
the government in any international situation, not authorized by the President or a member of the cabinet"'
without consultation with the Department of State. Id. at 95.
12. Act of Jan. 12, 1938, ch. 2, § 1, 52 Stat. 3. Although Congress never likely intended the term
"equipment" to apply to documents, Roosevelt wanted to invoke statutory authorization for his order rather
than ground it in inherent executive authority. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 339; Relyea, supra note 5,
at 18.
13. Exec. Order No. 8,381, 3 C.F.R. 634 (1938-1943).
14. Exec. Order No. 9,182,7 Fed. Reg. 4468 (June 16, 1942).
15. Williams S. Moorhead, Operation and Reform of the Classification System in the United States,
in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 87, 94 (Thomas M. Franck & Edward Weisband eds. 1974); Arvin S.
Quist, Security Classifications of Information, Volume 1, Classification Under Executive Orders, 4-7
[Vol. 30454
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ment' s classification authority during World War Il was considerably broader
and more organized than in World War I, it still exercised that authority only
to "safeguard[] .. .military secrets, rarely extending [it] to either secrets
affecting related non-military agencies or those involving foreign policy or
diplomatic relations."' 6
As in World War I, officials during World War H also enlisted the press
regarding the dissemination of classified information. Created in 1941, The
Office of Censorship identified information potentially helpful to the enemy
that the press was to refrain from publishing until it consulted with the
Office.17 This system was also voluntary although the press apparently com-
plied with it.'8 In large part, such compliance was due to the government's
limited application of censorship. As one commentator noted, "[tihe Office
scrupulously sought to limit censorship to matters involving a definite military
risk and to avoid suppressing information merely because it was embarrassing
to the Government."' 19
With the end of World War HI, executive attempts to maintain confidential-
ity of classified information expanded dramatically and became increasingly
controversial. Much of this came about with the advent of nuclear weapons and
the United States' changing position in world politics. As the United States
entered the Cold War in its new role as a dominant super power, government
officials expansively viewed threats to national security. Every threat to
American interests at home or abroad, especially those posed by Communism
and potential nuclear warfare, was perceived as a potential national security
crisis, which required increasingly dramatic action by the executive branch.2"
Such action included increased classification of information.
(2002), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/quist/index.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2004)
[hereinafter, Quist, Chapter 3].
16. Moorhead, supra note 15, at 94; see also Quist, Chapter 3, supra note 15, at 2-3.
17. Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REv.
1130, 1194 (1972) [hereinafter Developments-National Security].
18. WIGGINS, supra note 11, at 95-99.
19. Developments-NationalSecurity, supra note 17, at 1194.
20. Lobel, supra note 1, at 1400; Thomas S. Blanton, National Security and Open Government in
the United States, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 40-41
(2003), available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/opengov/NSOG.pdf (last visited June 8,2004).
As Arthur Schlesinger noted,
[t]he new American approach to world affairs, nurtured in the sense of omnipresent crisis,
set new political objectives, developed new military capabilities, devised new diplomatic
techniques, invented new instruments of foreign operations and instituted a new hierarchy
of values. Every one of these innovations encouraged the displacement of power, both
practical and constitutional, from an increasingly acquiescent Congress into an increasingly
imperial Presidency.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 164.
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 30 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 455 2004
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In 1947, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act allowing an executive
commission to control the dissemination of "restricted data" relevant to atomic
energy.2' A year later it enacted the National Security Act, which unified the
government's defense structure and explicitly imbued the director of the CIA
with responsibility for safeguarding intelligence. 2 Even these congressional
enactments, however, left a great deal of discretion regarding classification of
information to executive officials.23
In 1951, Truman signed Executive Order 10,290, which vastly expanded
the government's ability to classify information. Truman's order broadened
the categories of classification and extended the classification system beyond
military officials, allowing any civilian agency to classify information "neces-
sary... to protect the security of the United States., 24 Truman's order was
not limited to information pertaining to "national defense" during wartime but
allowed classification of military and non-military information if necessary to
protect "national security," a move essentially allowing the government to
establish a peacetime classification system based upon an undefined and
elastic concept.25 Finally, unlike Roosevelt, Truman grounded authority for
the executive order in inherent executive power rather than statutory authori-
zation, thus cementing executive control over classified information. 6
Executive Order 10,290 was highly criticized. With only vague guide-
lines regarding classification and the meaning of "national security," and no
provision for review of classification decisions, critics argued that the order
would inevitably lead to a massive increase in information classification.27
When President Eisenhower took office in 1953, he responded to such con-
cerns with a new executive order narrowing classification guidelines, includ-
ing allowing classification of information relevant to "national defense" rather
than "national security," withdrawing classification authority from various
civilian agencies, and providing for executive branch review of classification
decisions.28
Eisenhower's new order was not without problems. Eisenhower also
relied on inherent executive authority for the order as opposed to statutory
21. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 10, 60 Stat. 766. For a history of the Act and the events
leading up to it, see Arvin S. Quist, Security Classifications of Information, Volume 1, Classification Under
the Atomic Energy Act, 1-8 (2002), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/quist/index.html (last
visited Aug. 11, 2004) [hereinafter, Quist, Chapter 4].
22. Relyea, supra note 5, at 19 n.40.
23. Id. at 19.
24. Exec. Order No. 10,290, Part I, § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 790 (1949-53).
25. Quist, Chapter 3, supra note 15, at 9.
26. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 340; Relyea, .supra note 5, at 20.
27. Developments-National Security, supra note 17, at 1196; Moorhead, supra note 15, at 94.
28. Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 979 (1949-53).
456 [Vol. 30
HeinOnline  -- 30 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 456 2004
TOOLS OF REPRESSION
authorization. 29 The order also provided no guidance with respect to declas-
sification of information.3" Furthermore, the classification scheme remained
problematic in practice. Several executive and congressional commissions
during the 1950s found that over-classification of information was a signifi-
cant problem. One commission found, for example, that the power to classify
had expanded to "some 1.5 million employees" and that overuse of the label
"confidential" had begun to interfere with the free flow of scientific and tech-
nical information.3 Others concluded that Pentagon officials were overly
cautious, tended to overclassify, and failed to declassify information that no
longer required secrecy.32 Despite their uniform conclusions regarding abuse,
the committees' calls for reform of the classification system went largely
ignored.
Classification of information continued to be a problem throughout the
1950s and 1960s. By 1971, several government officials acknowledged that
over-classification was a substantial problem, with some estimating that 90 to
99.5 percent of information was inappropriately classified.3 3 Furthermore,
classification guidelines had broadened to include designations such as "above
Top Secret," a designation that was itself classified and over which there was
little, if any, control.34 Despite President Kennedy's executive order providing
a mechanism for declassification of information,35 executive officials proved
reluctant to do so, and interpreted Kennedy's order as inapplicable to them.3 6
In addition, the government's desire for secrecy spread to non-classified
information. The Office of Strategic Information, established in 1953,
"work[ed] with the business community 'in voluntary efforts to prevent
unclassified strategic data from being made available to those foreign nations
which might use such data in a manner harmful to the defense interests of the
United States.' 37 The Defense Department similarly encouraged private con-
29. Relyea, supra note 5, at 21.
30. Id.
31. Moorhead, supra note 15, at 96.
32. Id. at 95-97; SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 341-42.
33. One official estimated that fully 99.5 percent of classified information within the Defense
Department (estimated to encompass twenty million documents) could be declassified without prejudicing
national security. Developments-National Security, supra note 17, at 1201. Another testified that 75
percent of that information "should never have been classified in the first place; another 15 percent quickly
outlived the need for secrecy; and only about 10 percent genuinely required restricted access over any
significant period of time." Moorhead, supra note 15, at 100. According to such officials, classified items
included newspaper clippings and other clippings in the public domain, as well as memos from government
officials complaining about overclassification. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 344.
34. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 344.
35. Exec. Order No. 10,964, 26 Fed. Reg. 8932 (Sept. 22, 1961).
36. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 343.
37. WIGGINS, supra note 11, at 102-03.
2004]
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tractors to avoid disclosing unclassified information that was "of possible use"
to enemies of the United States.3" Even President Kennedy, one of the few
presidents inclined to openness after World War II, requested newspapers to
refrain from publishing any information that was not "in the interest of
national security. ' 39  These attempts at "voluntary" censorship were far
broader than any government actions in World Wars I and I and engendered
much protest by the press and organizations subject to the regulations.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, controversy erupted regarding several
previously-secret incidents-the Kennedy administration's Bay of Pigs
debacle, the government's secrecy with respect to its operations in Vietnam
(which ultimately led to an expansion of the United States' role therein), the
government's non-neutral stance about the India-Pakistan War, and the
publication of the Pentagon Papers-prompting more thorough investigation
of government secrecy.40 In response to these investigations, Nixon signed
a new executive order regarding classified information.41
Although Nixon claimed to be restricting the government's ability to
classify information," critics assailed Executive Order 11,652, noting that it
broadened classification authority to matters "in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy," essentially returning to the elastic notion of
"national security" used in Truman's order.43 They further charged that the
order permitted executive officials to delay release of information in their own
self-interest and "totally miscontrue[d] the basic meaning of the Freedom of
Information Act,"' which had been enacted in 1967 to enhance public access
to government records.45
38. Id. at 110.
39. Developments-National Security, supra note 17, at 1197. In a public speech to newspaper
publishers, Kennedy noted that
"[olur way of life is under attack.... If the press is awaiting a declaration of war before it
imposes the self-discipline of combat conditions, then I can only say that no war ever posed
a greater threat to our security....
The facts of the matter are that this nation's foes have openly boasted of acquiring
through our newspapers information they would otherwise hire agents to acquire through
theft, bribery, or espionage .... "
Id. (quoting President John F. Kennedy, Address to American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n (Apr. 27,
1961)).
40. Moorhead, supra note 15, at 89; Relyea, supra note 5, at 22.
41. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 37 Fed Reg. 5,209 (Mar. 10,1972).
42. Moorhead, supra note 15, at 102.
43. Relyea, supra note 5, at 24.
44. Executive Classification oflnformation-Security Classification Problems Involving Exemption
(b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act, H.R. REP. No. 93-221, 93rd Cong. 58-59 (1973).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l)-(9) (2001). For a history on FOIA, see generally HERBERT N. FOERSTEL,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW: THE ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT (1999).
[Vol. 30
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The Nixon administration also used criminal penalties to protect govern-
ment secrecy. Most famously, the Nixon administration brought Espionage
Act prosecutions against Daniel Ellsberg, the former government official who
leaked the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times and Washington Post.
Prior to the Ellsberg trial, the government had never pursued criminal
prosecution against a government official for leaking classified information
as a matter of public interest, instead leaving such discipline to the administra-
tive process.4 6 Critics of the administration's actions noted that officials
regularly leaked information to the press as a way of keeping the public
informed and for their own advocacy purposes.47 Others argued that the
espionage laws did not allow prosecution for leaking information absent a
malicious intent toward the security interests of the United States,48 which
Ellsberg did not have. 9 In order to punish Ellsberg, however, the Nixon
administration pursued criminal penalties, and might have done so success-
fully had the case against Ellsberg not been dismissed due to the government's
misconduct."
In response to the Nixon administration's actions, Congress attempted
some reform regarding government secrecy in the 1970s. Believing that the
Nixon order gave far too much unchecked classification power to the execu-
tive branch, Congress amended FOIA to give courts the power to review in
camera the propriety of government classification designations.5 Congressio-
nal panels also recommended that Congress enact legislation establishing
classification guidelines in order to protect national security while ensuring
that government did not abuse the secrecy process.52 No such legislation
materialized. It is further unclear whether judicial review of classification
designations has had much effect. 3
46. Leonard B. Boudin, The Ellsberg Case: Citizen Disclosure, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY,
supra note 15, at 291.
47. Id. at 309-310.
48. The classic examination of the Espionage laws is Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, The
Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 929 (1973); see also
Boudin, supra note 46, at 296-98; supra note 10 and accompanying text.
49. Boudin, supra note 46, at 294-95 (describing Ellsberg's reasons for disclosing information).
50. Officials in the Nixon administration broke into the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist in order to
find embarrassing information about him. With regard to the Ellsberg prosecution, see generally PETER
SCHRAG, TEST OF LOYALTY, DANIEL ELLSBERG AND THE RiTuALs OF SECRET GOVERNMENT 224-77 (1974).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(B) (2001). For background on the Nixon order and FOIA's amendment,
see Relyea, supra note 5, at 24. Congress also acted partly in response to a Supreme Court decision finding
that FOIA originally had not provided for judicial review of classification decisions. EPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73,94 (1973).
52. Relyea, supra note 5, at 26.
53. Commentators argued that this reform was only marginally helpful because courts determining
whether information is properly classified do not review the appropriateness of classification procedures
2004] 459
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Even after FOIA, then, public access to "national security" information
has depended largely on the good will of the President. Such good will has
been inconsistently present, at best, and effectively non-existent, at worst.
President Ford vetoed the 1974 amendments to FOIA (which Congress
overrode) on the basis that judicial review of classification procedures vio-
lated the President's inherent, constitutional powers.54 In contrast, President
Carter's order emphasized the importance of "the public's interest in access
to Government information" and the need to balance it against national
security concerns55- e first executive order ever to do so.56 While acknow-
ledged as an improvement over Nixon's order, observers noted that Carter's
order was "nonetheless weighted toward secrecy" and lacked sufficient over-
sight and control mechanisms.57
If Carter's order had its problems, the Reagan administration's approach
to classification was disastrous with respect to public access to information.
Executive Order 12,35658 eliminated consideration of the public's right to
know, expanded the categories of classifiable information, mandated that
information within such categories be classified, eliminated automatic declas-
sification, authorized reclassification of information, and encouraged clas-
sifiers to err on the side of classification. 59 The Reagan administration also
successfully pushed for amendments weakening FOIA's disclosure require-
ments by broadening the categories of information that could be exempted.6 °
Reagan officials further withheld from the public non-classifiable information
(i.e., "sensitive but unclassified" information) because such information could
be exploited by terrorists and others working against the United States.6'
but only ask whether the executive branch is following its own classification procedures. Note, Keeping
Secrets: Congress, the Courts, and National Security Information, 103 HARV. L. REV. 906, 909 (1990).
54. Morton H. Halperin, The President and National Security Information, in THE PRESIDENCY AND
INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 5. Congress, however, overrode Ford's veto. Id.
55. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28949 (July 3, 1978).
56. Halperin, supra note 54, at 68-69.
57. Relyea, supra note 5, at 26.
58. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14874-14884 (Apr. 6, 1982).
59. Harold C. Relyea, Historical Development of Federal Information Policy, in UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION POLICIES 25, 40 (Charles R. McClure et al. eds. 1989); Blanton, supra note
20, at 44; Quist, Chapter 3, supra note 15, at 22.
60. Diana M.T.K. Autin, The Reagan Administration and the Freedom of Information Act, in
FREEDOM AT RISK: SECRECY CENSORSHIP AND REPRESSION IN THE 1980s, 69,79-80 (Richard 0. Curry ed.
1988); FOERSTEL, supra note 45, at 51-57.
61. See Genevieve J. Knezo, "Sensitive But Unclassified" and Other Federal Security Controls on
Scientific Information: History and Current Controversy 11-13 (2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31845.pdf (last visited Aug. 12,2004). The Reagan administration instituted
numerous other mechanisms for secrecy regarding scientific and technical data. See generally John
Shattuck, Federal Restrictions on the Free Flow ofAcademic Information and Ideas, in FREEDOM AT RISK,
supra note 60, at 45-59.
[Vol. 30
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Finally, hearkening back to the Nixon era, the Reagan administration pursued
an Espionage Act prosecution against a government official who leaked
information to a magazine publisher although the evidence showed he had not
done so to injure the United States.62 Reagan officials further intimated that
they would pursue not only government officials but any publisher of the
information as well, including newspapers and journalists.63
The Clinton administration reversed many of these polices, maintaining
an openness that was unmatched by any previous administration.' Even here,
however, the administration regressed toward secrecy. Spurred by allegations
of carelessness regarding nuclear secrets, high-profile espionage cases
involving CIA employees, and other politics, Clinton officials began refusing
to provide unclassified information that had been public for years and fighting
public requests regarding the CIA budget on the basis that such information
"would put the United States at risk."65 Not surprisingly, a government com-
mission examining the issue of government secrecy in 1997 concluded that it
remained a significant problem-costing Americans billions of dollars and
eroding democratic principles of government accountability.66 Nevertheless,
Congress has not followed the commission's recommendations for legislation
regarding the classification system. 67
B. Government Control of Public Information
In times of national security crises, government officials have also tried
to control public information to galvanize support for its efforts by minimizing
dissension and creating an impression regarding the necessity of its actions.
Such control of information has occurred through direct censorship or indirect
censorship.
1. Direct Censorship
World War I provides the best example of direct government censorship.
At the behest of the Wilson administration, which argued that dissent was
"threatening the formation and maintenance of the armed forces," Congress
passed two pieces of legislation designed to punish speech interfering with the
62. Steven Burkholder, The Morison Case: The Leaker as "Spy," in FREEDOM AT RISK, supra note
60, at 117-39. See also United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
63. Burkholder, supra note 62, at 120-21 (citing government memoranda).
64. Blanton, supra note 20, at 52-53. For details on Clinton's executive order (Exec. Order No.
12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (Apr. 20, 1995)), see Quist, Chapter 3, supra note 15, at 22-3 1.
65. Blanton, supra note 20, at 52-54.
66. Secrecy Report, supra note 1, at 9-10 (cost estimates); id. at 7-9 (listing the intangible costs of
secrecy).
67. id. at 13.
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war effort.68 In 1917, Congress enacted the Espionage Act, providing criminal
penalties for intentionally making false reports interfering with the war effort,
causing insubordination or disloyalty in the military forces, or obstructing the
draft. The Act also authorized the Postmaster to refuse to mail materials
violating the Act.6 9 In 1918, Congress further adopted the Sedition Act, which
punished publication of information intended to cause contempt for the United
States government, the Constitution or the flag of the United States, or
supporting a country at war with the United States.7"
The Espionage and Sedition Acts proved to be powerful weapons of
suppression. Federal officials brought over 2,100 indictments under the
Acts,7 most of which involved speech critical of the war or the government
rather than overt acts of disloyalty.72 Thus, individuals were indicted for such
things as distributing a pamphlet teaching that "Christians should not kill in
wars" or arguing that "we must make the world safe for democracy, even if we
have to bean the goddess of liberty to do it."73  Such indictments were
problematic primarily because they reached far into the realm of seemingly
innocent speech. Many prosecutions, however, were more than simply over-
zealous. Rather, they were specifically designed to destroy radical, social
groups, such as the International Workers of the World and the Socialist Party,
whose political philosophies the Wilson administration feared.74 Thus, such
prosecutions were not used to punish disloyalty but to enforce a national
conformity by frightening people into silence.
The government also attempted to censor certain speech during the Cold
War by prosecuting members of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) under
the Smith Act,75 a peacetime sedition law prohibiting advocacy of overthrow
of the government. Ostensibly the purpose of such a law was to prevent
overthrow of the government by punishing those trying to incite such action.
The Smith Act, however, was never used to punish the CPUSA for actual
attempts to overthrow the government or even advocacy of such overthrow.
Rather, despite voluminous evidence-gathering by the FBI, the government
was unable to prove that the CPUSA advocated forcible overthrow of the
68. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 249 (1997); see also Christina E.
Wells. Discussing the First Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1566, 1581-82 (2003) (reviewing LEE C.
BOLLINGER & GEOFFREY R. STONE, ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (2002)).
69. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 219.
70. Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553.
71. ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA FROM 1870-1976,
113 (rev. ed. 2001).
72. Id.
73. Wells, supra note 68, at 1583. See also RABBAN, supra note 68, at 259-60: GOLDSTEIN. supra
note 71, at 113-14.
74. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 115.
75. Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 72, 54 Stat. 79.
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government.76 As a result, it prosecuted CPUSA members for "conspiring"
to advocate forcible overthrow of the government. These charges rested on
the theory that CPUSA leaders, in organizing and administering the CPUSA,
taught Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which allegedly involved forcible overthrow
as a necessary aspect of a Communist revolution." The evidence for such
prosecutions consisted of little more than Marxist-Leninist literature distri-
buted by CPUSA members and testimony "interpreting" that literature from
former CPUSA members.78
In effect, the Smith Act trials of CPUSA leaders were essentially political
trials based upon the CPUSA leaders' belief in the possibility of an alternative
political and economic system. As one commentator noted, such trials lacked
any basis in law or fact and were little more than prosecutions for "organizing
a group to commit a speech crime."79 Typically, overtly political speech
would have been protected by the First Amendment.8" Nevertheless, the
government systematically prosecuted CPUSA leaders during the Cold War
for violating the advocacy provisions of the Smith Act.8 '
2. Indirect Censorship
During times of crisis, the government also has relied on equally power-
ful, if more indirect, censorship tools. Such tools fall into three categories
76. PETER L. STEINBERG, THE GREAT "RED MENACE:" UNITED STATES PROSECUTION OF AMERICAN
COMMUNISTS 1947-1952, 108 (1984); see also MICHALR. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE
SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIvIL LIBERTIES 80-81 (1977).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367,374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (setting forth grandjury
indictment of CPUSA leaders).
78. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 1950) (discussing evidence introduced
at one of the CPUSA trials), afTd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); BELKNAP, supra note 76, at 80-92.
79. HARRY KALVEN, JR., AWORTHY TRADITION 193 (1988); see also STEINBERG, supra note 76,
at 157.
80. In several cases prior to Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the decision in which the
Supreme Court upheld the CPUSA leaders' convictions, the Court had applied a very speech protective
standard to political statements. See cases cited in Wells supra note 68, at 1577; see also Marc Rohr,
Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of Freedom of Advocacy in the Cold War Era, 28
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 31-36 (1991); Note, Clear and Present Danger Re-examined, 51 COLUM. L. REV.
98, 103-05 (1951).
81. Although Dennis involved the most famous ofthe CPUSA prosecutions, the government pursued
CPUSA leaders in at least 126 prosecutions throughout the country. BELKNAP, supra note 76, at 156-57;
Robert Mollan, Smith Act Prosecutions: The Effect of the Dennis and Yates Decisions, 26 U. PITT. L. REv.
705, 710-16, 723 (1965).
During this period the government also pursued many CPUSA leaders under the membership
clause of the Smith Act, which prohibited active membership in an organization advocating forcible
overthrow of the government. In fact, many of the CPUSA leaders who were convicted of conspiring to
advocate overthrow of the government were released from jail only to be rearrested for membership clause
violations. Mollan, supra, at 716-20; BELKNAP, supra note 76, at 262-65, 271-72.
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-government propaganda, government accusations of lack of patriotism, and
public stigmatization of people with certain beliefs or who belong to particular
groups. Unlike direct punishment of expression, indirect tools amount to
censorship by setting a national agenda and using pressure to conform as
means to discourage dissenting opinions. Though they carry no legal
sanctions, indirect tools can be remarkably effective.
Government officials perceiving a potential national security threat have
often engaged in widespread propaganda-i.e., dissemination of wholly or
partially untrue information-to spur public support for immediate action.
Such campaigns focus on an exaggerated characterization of the threat posed
by certain individuals or groups. Specifically, government officials character-
ize the threat as new (thus requiring expanded powers), devious (often hidden
within or controlling seemingly innocuous organizations) and immensely
powerful (primarily because they were puppets of a threatening foreign
power).82
Prior to and during World War I, for example, President Wilson gave
numerous speeches emphasizing the threatening nature of radical groups and
immigrants although he knew them to pose no threat of actual espionage or
sabotage.83 Thus, in a 1915 address he claimed that
[t]he gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been
uttered within our own borders. There are citizens of the United
States . . . born under other flags but welcomed by our generous
naturalization laws... who have poured the poison of disloyalty into
the very arteries of our national life."
He similarly accused the "military masters of Germany" of filling "our unsus-
pecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators" and of using
"liberals in their enterprise . . .- socialists, the leaders of labor" to sow
disloyalty in America. 5
82. For a discussion of the characteristics of propaganda, see Richard Delgado, The Language of
the Arms Race: Should the People Limit Government Speech?, 64 B.U. L. REV. 961 (1984).
83. The Wilson administration kept close watch on all potential spies and saboteurs in the German-
American population, identifying approximately 1,800 for potential action in the event of war. SENATE
SELECTCOMM. To STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECTTO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL
REPORT: INTELLIGENCE ACIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S; REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., Bk III,
380 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK I]. Almost all those persons believed to
pose a threat during World War I were interned shortly after the war began. CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR
HOOVER: THEMAN ANDTHESECRETS 71(1991). Wilson's rhetorical invocation of the "spy within" image
was aimed less at this threat than at galvanizing support for repression of radical groups who were heavily
dominated by German immigrants who were not spies.
84. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress (Dec. 7, 1915), in 53 CONG. REC. 99 (1915).
85. President Woodrow Wilson, Flag Day Address (June 14, 1917), in 55 CONG. REC. app. at 332,
334 (1917).
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During World War II and the Cold War, government officials similarly
characterized Japanese-Americans and CPUSA members, respectively, as
potentially monstrous threats. Despite affirmative evidence regarding the
loyalty of most Japanese-Americans, 86 government officials argued for their
externship based upon the notion that they were almost inherently incapable
of such loyalty:
"[t]he Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and
third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of
United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized,' the racial
strains are undiluted.... It, therefore, follows that along the vital
Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies, of Japanese extraction,
are at large today."87
To spur support for his Cold War pursuit of domestic communists, J. Edgar
Hoover, Director of the FBI, also painted a fearsome-if inaccurate-picture
of them as devious and clever puppets of the Soviet Union:
The Communist, once he is fully trained and indoctrinated, realizes
that he can create his order in the United States only by "bloody
revolution. ...
... [Cleverly, however, the] American progress which all good
citizens seek, such as age-old security, houses for veterans, child
assistance, and a host of others is being adopted as window dressing
by Communists to conceal their true aims and entrap gullible
followers....
The numerical strength of the party's enrolled membership is
insignificant....
... [R]ather than the size of the Communist party, the way to
weigh its true importance is by testing its influence, its ability to
infiltrate
The size of the party is relatively unimportant because of the
enthusiasm and iron-clad discipline under which they operate.88
86. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERMENT CASES
274-79 (1989) (discussing government reports concluding that Japanese-Americans were largely loyal to
the United States).
87. COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED, 66 (1982) (quoting General DeWitt).
88. J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before HUAC, Mar. 26, 1947, in ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF
MCCARTHYISM 114-20 (1994). Government officials were quite aware that most members of the CPUSA
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The existence of official propaganda machines facilitated these
inaccurate portrayals of allegedly threatening domestic groups. During World
War I, for example, the government's Committee on Public Information
promoted films and organized speakers that recounted German atrocities, an
action that further inflamed nativist and anti-immigrant sentiment.89 Similarly,
during the Cold War, FBI Director Hoover began a massive, secret educa-
tional campaign, including feeding his exaggerated image to newspaper
reporters and anti-communist groups, to inform Americans about the dangers
of domestic communism.9°
In addition to propaganda, government officials also tried to co-opt
public debate by accusing those who disagreed with them of being unpatriotic.
Thus, during World War I, one prominent American noted:
"The men who oppose the war; who fail to support the gov't in every
measure which really tends to the efficient prosecution of the war;
and above all who in any shape or way champion the cause and the
actions of Germany, show themselves to the Huns within our own
gates and allies of the men whom our sons and brothers are crossing
the ocean to fight."91
Being branded as unpatriotic was not mere innocuous labeling. Rather, it
could have significant consequences. As one commentator noted, during
World War I "people who objected to, or even questioned, America's role in
the war faced vilification by the press and the threat of mob violence." 92
Finally, government officials often tried to induce conformity of thought
and action by publicly exposing persons whom they believed belonged to
dangerous organizations. Typically, government characterized this stigmatiza-
tion as necessary to protect against anti-democratic propaganda. During its
preparation for World War I, for example, Congress required that ownership
of certain (often radical) publications sent through the mails be revealed
because
"[tihe extremely low postage rate accorded to second-class matter
gives these publications a circulation and a corresponding influence
unequaled in history. It is a common belief that many periodicals are
did not pose a threat to national security. See Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional
Decision-Making 26 (Sept. 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
89. Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America's "First Freedom, "1909-
1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557, 576-77 (1999).
90. RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE 85 (1990);
CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK HI, supra note 83, at 430.
91. Secrecy Report, supra note 1, at A-I (quoting President Theodore Roosevelt).
92. Bobertz, supra note 89, at 577.
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secretly owned or controlled, and that in reading such papers the
public is deceived through ignorance of the interests the publication
represents."93
Prior to World War II, the rise in popularity of fascist groups similarly
prompted calls for exposure of the "identity and activities of foreign agents"
in order to "'destroy[] the poison of totalitarian propaganda."' 94 Such beliefs
ultimately resulted in the Voorhis Act, which required the registration of
groups with foreign affiliations.95
Public exposure as a tool reached its zenith, however, during the Cold
War when HUAC, relying on information provided by the FBI, "regularly
issued indices of identified 'communist sympathizers,' which became the
basis of formal and informal blacklists in the public and private sectors. '"96
Beginning in 1947, the Attorney General also regularly published lists of
"subversive" organizations that ostensibly posed a threat to the United
States.91 The Internal Security Act of 1950 further required the registration
of all Communist and "communist front" organizations.9"
As with claims that dissenters were unpatriotic, public exposure of "com-
munist sympathizers," "communist front organizations" and "subversives"
was far from harmless. The definition of such terms was never clear and often
interpreted far more broadly than necessary.99 Furthermore, these lists became
the basis of thousands of public and private actions, including interrogation
by loyalty boards, job dismissal, and other social or economic sanctions. °°
Such broad stigmatization took a substantial toll on Americans as a whole,
who became less willing to engage in open discussion."' As one commentator
noted:
In its full flower, the evils of the "method of exposure" were at least
three-fold: The arbitrary and uncontrolled imposition of disabilities
on citizens subjected to compelled disclosure, the substantive impact
of exposure on individual exercise of constitutionally protected rights
93. Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 312 (1913) (quoting S. REP. No. 955,62nd Cong.
24(1912)).
94. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 22 (1991) (quoting Institute of Living Law,
Combating Totalitarian Propaganda, The Method of Exposure, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 107, 108-09 (1943)).
95. Act of Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 897, 54 Stat. 1201.
96. Kreimer, supra note 94, at 18. On the relationship between the FBI and HUAC, see id. at 19
n.45; ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 214-15 (1998).
97. Steinberg, supra note 76, at 29-30.
98. Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987.
99. Secrecy Report, supra note 1, at A-43.
100. Kreimer, supra note 94, at 18 n.44.
101. Id. at 20 (citing opinion polls regarding public willingness to speak out).
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of speech, thought, and associations, and the constraint on public
thought and discourse from the fear of public investigation of private
or long-buried beliefs and associations.'°2
C. Government Information Gathering
The third form of governmental information control involves information
gathering-i.e., intelligence' 3-regarding potential national security threats.
During national security crises, when threats to national security are at their
apex, the government expands its intelligence efforts. As history shows, how-
ever, although such efforts begin with legitimate national security concerns,
they often mutate into tools of harassment of disfavored political groups.
1. Historical Pattern of Intelligence-Gathering
Although state and federal governments have always collected intelli-
gence in some form,0 4 World War I saw an enormous expansion of intelli-
gence-gathering at the federal level in response to perceived threats from
enemy aliens. Military intelligence personnel, for example, expanded from
"two officers in earlyl1l7... to more than 300 uniformed officers and 1,000
civilian employees" by the end of the war.l15 Similarly, the Justice Depart-
ment's newly created Bureau of Investigation ("Br'), precursor to the FBI,
expanded from 100 to 300 agents.'0 6 The BI's responsibilities also expanded
beyond a narrowly defined set of crimes to include investigations of neutrality
law violations.'07 Soon thereafter Congress further extended the BI's authority
to investigations involving "'official matters under the control of the
Department of Justice or the Department of State, as may be directed by the
102. Id. at 22.
103. See FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE xiv-xv (1980). Donner describes
intelligence gathering as "a sequential process, which embraces the selection of the subject (an organization
or individual) for surveillance, the techniques, both overt and clandestine, used in monitoring the subject
or target, the processing and retention of information collected (files and dossiers), and its evaluation in the
light of a strategic purpose (the intelligence mission)." Id. at 3. He further notes an "aggressive" aspect
to intelligence that involves damage to or harassment of the target. Id. Typically, government officials
gather intelligence by physical or electronic surveillance, i.e., wiretaps, physical searches, etc. There are,
however, related forms of surveillance, such as infiltration of private groups or enlistment of private
entities/individuals to gather intelligence on the government's behalf.
104. For a brief history of intelligence efforts prior to World War I, see id. at 31.
105. HAROLD M. HYMAN, To TRY MEN'S SouLs 271 (1959).
106. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK IM, supra note 83, at 379. For a history of the BI's birth
and evolution up to 1916, see GENTRY, supra note 83.
107. GENTRY, supra note 83, at 114; Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA
PATRIOTAct in the Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR.
L. REV. 1051, 1071 (2002).
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Attorney General,'""08 language the BI interpreted as allowing it to engage in
surveillance and investigations of enemy aliens for possible espionage or
sabotage at the request of the Secretary of State. 9
As the war continued, the government's intelligence activities expanded
well beyond identifying actual threats of espionage or sabotage. As one
historian noted:
[m]ilitary intelligence agents participated in a wide range of dubious
activities, which involved a wholesale system of spying on civilians
that would be unmatched in scope until the late 1960's. Military
intelligence activities included surveillance of the IWW, the SPA, the
pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation and the National Civil Liberties
Bureau, forerunner of the American Civil Liberties Union. In some
cases, military intelligence infiltrated the ranks of groups under sur-
veillance and participated in raids and arrests of radical organiza-
tions."0
In some instances, military intelligence officers provoked strikes that they
later "broke" via illegal raids and jailing of IWW members."' Other govern-
ment personnel recommended investigation of targeted politicians and judges
because their political or judicial decisions seemed too "radical."' 2 The BI's
intelligence activities also expanded well beyond any real threat posed by
enemy aliens. Thus, investigations targeted any "[c]riticism of the war,
opposition to the draft, expression of pro-German or pacifist sympathies, and
militant labor organizing efforts.""I3 These intelligence activities served as the
basis for the thousands of repressive Espionage and Sedition Act prosecutions
mentioned in the previous section." 4 Many were designed to do little more
than destroy the disfavored political groups that were their target.
The government also enlisted private organizations to work on its behalf
during World War I. Thus, Attorney General Gregory publicly requested
"every loyal American to act as 'a volunteer detective"' regarding disloyalty,
assuring citizens that they "'should feel free to bring their suspicions and
information to the ... Department of Justice."""' Similarly, the BI worked
108. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 83, at 379 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 533(3)
(2001)). Congress gave the BI this authority as part of an appropriations request in 1917.
109. Id. at 379-80.
110. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 110.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK HI, supra note 83, at 382.
114. See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
115. HYMAN, supra note 105, at 271-72 (citation omitted). Gregory also intimated that it was
citizens' "patriotic duty" to report disloyal acts. Id. at 272.
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closely with the American Protective League ("APL"), a vigilante organiza-
tion initially formed to prevent German sabotage and espionage by using
citizens in business to report on disloyalty, industrial disturbances or other
actions potentially harming the nation." 6 With the APL's help, the BI staged
a series of raids on IWW offices in 1917, rounding up hundreds of radicals
allegedly posing a threat to national security." 7 Since most German agents
had been rounded up months earlier, such raids were largely designed to
destroy union influence rather than protect national security." 8 The APL's
overzealous investigations of "un-American activities" led to significant
abuses, involving "illegal arrests, strikebreaking, wiretapping, bugging, frame-
ups, extortion, blackmail, kidnappings, rapes, and even... [in one case]
murder."' 1
9
Rather than bringing about a decline in intelligence-gathering, the end of
World War I saw a greatly expanded role for intelligence investigators. A
series of "anarchist" bombings in 1919 rekindled national fear (the "Red
Scare"), causing public and congressional demands for federal government
action. 20 In response, Attorney General Palmer begged Congress for more
resources, noting that the "recent bombings were part of a vast conspiracy to
overthrow the government of the United States .... [T]he danger is immi-
nent." '' With these new resources, Palmer reorganized the BI, which
immediately expanded its investigations of "'anarchists and similar classes,
Bolshevism, and kindred agitations."'122 In 1919-20, these investigations,
which also involved private citizens as informants, 123 resulted in a series of
raids in which tens of thousands of aliens were rounded up and deported
without due process of law. 24
116. JOAN M. JENSEN, THE PRICE OF VIGILANCE 25 (1968). For a more in-depth discussion of the
APL, see HYMAN, supra note 105, at 272-97.
117. GENTRY, supra note 83, at 71.
118. Id.; JENSEN, supra note 116, at 32.
119. GENTRY, supra note 83, at 72. See also Saito, supra note 107, at 1073. The APL's abuse of
civil liberties culminated in the "slacker" raids of 1918, in which thousands of citizens allegedly violating
the selective service laws were forcibly rounded-up and detained without adequate due process. CHURCH
COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK U13, supra note 83, at 381.
120. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK m, supra note 83, at 382-83; FRIED, supra note 90, at
42.
121. GENTRY, supra note 83, at 77; DONNER, supra note 103, at 33-34.
122. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK m, supra note 83, at 383. Military intelligence of
domestic activities also continued during this period. Id. at 387.
123. For more detail on surveillance techniques during the Red Scare, see RICHARD POLENBERG,
FIGHTING FArHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 161-96 (1987).
124. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 83, at 383-85; DONNER, supra note 103,
at 35-39.
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While the raids were deplorable, of greater interest for this paper is the
lasting surveillance machinery established during the Red Scare. Soon after
being appointed director of the BI's "General Intelligence Division" in 1919,
J. Edgar Hoover established an index of "radicals, their organizations, and
publications."' 125 Within months, the index contained 150,000 names, increas-
ing to 450,000 by 1921.126 The index further contained detailed biographies
of 70,000 of the more important radicals (i. e.,.those "showing 'any connection
with an ultra radical body or movement."'), 127 including transcriptions of
speeches, writings, and newspaper articles by or regarding particular indivi-
duals.'28 Although the FBI could point to no tangible accomplishments as a
result of the index, it proved to be a valuable tool for harassment of ostensibly
subversive groups. As one commentator noted, during this period "[t]he
bureau wiretapped at random, broke into offices and kept tabs on personal
lives. The targets were often critics of the bureau or of the Justice Department
and even included several senators who may have asked too many ques-
tions." 121
In 1924, newly-appointed Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone tried to
reign in the BI's excesses. Recognizing the BI had "become a secret political
police force . . . 'maintaining many activities which were without any
authority in federal statute's [sic] and engaging in many practices which were
brutal and tyrannical in the extreme,' 130 Stone ordered the BI to limit its
investigations to violations of the law and to rid itself of incompetent
personnel. He also appointed Hoover, who had promised to help with reform,
as director of the BI.' 3 ' While the Attorney General's reforms halted the most
egregious of the BI's practices, they were not safeguards against future abuse.
The BI maintained its intelligence files and continued to collect information
on Communists that it regularly shared with military intelligence.'
3 2
125. DONNER, supra note 103, at 34; CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 83, at
386.
126. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK HL1, supra note 83, at 386; DONNER, supra note 103, at
34.
127. GENTRY, supra note 83, at 79 (citation omitted).
128. DONNER, supra note 103, at 34-35.
129. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Reagan Administration, the First Amendment, and FBI Domestic
Security Investigations, in FREEDOM AT RISK, supra note 60, at 272, 274.
130. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK I supra note 83, at 388 (citation omitted).
131. GENTRY, supra note 83, at 127; DONNER, supra note 103, at 46.
132. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK 111, supra note 83, at 390-91; GENTRY, supra note 83,
at 141. Furthermore, local governments, private organizations and other branches of government filled the
intelligence void, gathering information regarding and harassing allegedly subversive groups, especially
labor unions. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK M, supra note 83, at 390; DONNER, supra note 103,
at 48.
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By 1936, the BI (now renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation)
renewed its intelligence activities with zeal after President Franklin Roosevelt
directed Hoover to gather information about "subversive activities in the
United States, particularly Fascism and Communism."' 3 3 Although there was
no specific statutory authority for such an investigation, both men relied on
the ill-defined authority given the FBI in an earlier 1917 appropriations
request.'-' Pursuant to this authority, the FBI began investigating "subver-
sive" organizations (including industries, labor, educational and youth
groups),' 35 using "all possible sources" of intelligence, including informants,
physical and technical surveillances, mail openings, and "black bagj obs" (i.e.,
burglaries).'36
In 1939, Roosevelt issued another confidential directive vesting authority
for the "investigation 'of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage
matters"' in the FBI and two other federal intelligence agencies.'37 While
enhanced intelligence activities were a legitimate concern in light of global
hostilities, this directive, coupled with the 1936 directive, caused lasting
confusion regarding the FBI's legal authority to collect domestic intelligence.
As one commentator noted:
J. Edgar Hoover assumed he had broad authority from the President,
going back to directives from Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s, for
conducting intelligence operations against "subversive activities" in
the United States. The scope of that authority was never adequately
defined, the practical meaning of "subversion" varied according to the
political climate of the times, and the Attorney General's role in
supervising the FBI was uncertain because the FBI director's mandate
came directly from the President.'38
Over the years, Hoover manipulated that confusion in order to maintain
intelligence on "an ever-expanding class of political dissidents."' 39
After World War H, the FBI intensified its intelligence investigations,
initially focusing on Communist and other revolutionary organizations who
133. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK III, supra note 83, at 394 (citing Hoover memorandum
of meeting dated 8/24/36).
134. GENTRY, supra note 83, at 207. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
135. GENTRY, supra note 83, at 207; CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK III, supra note 83, at
396-99; Saito, supra note 107, at 1075-76.
136. GENTRY, supra note 83, at 207-08; Saito, supra note 107, at 1075-76.
137. DONNER, supra note 103, at 57 (citations omitted); CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK I,
supra note 83, at 402-403.
138. JOHN T. ELLIFF, THE REFORM OF FBI INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 6-7 (1979). For further
discussion on the confusion surrounding the FBI's legal authority to conduct domestic intelligence
investigations, see DONNER, supra note 103, at 64-78.
139. Stone, supra note 129, at 274.
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might pose a threat to the country. 140 FBI officials believed, however, that it
was "'not possible to formulate any hard-and-fast standards by which the
dangerousness of individuals members or affiliates of revolutionary Organiza-
tions may be automatically measured.'"141 The FBI thus began to investigate
groups potentially subject to communist influence, a term defined broadly to
include groups dedicated to political, racial, children's, gender, agricultural,
cultural, veterans', educational and industrial issues. 142 Such investigations
rarely provided information regarding real threats, and instead provided politi-
cal intelligence for government officials. As in previous eras, the FBI relied
on a variety of legal and illegal information-gathering techniques, including
wiretaps, bugs, confidential informants, physical and photographic surveil-
lance, review of public and private records, and burglaries."'
The FBI's abuse of domestic intelligence-gathering culminated in its
now-infamous COINTELPRO operations, which it conducted from 1956 until
1971. Counterintelligence operations such as these ostensibly include "those
actions by an intelligence agency intended to protect its own security and to
undermine hostile intelligence operations." ' " The FBI's programs, however,
went far beyond intelligence-gathering to counter national security threats,
instead extending to "secret actions de[signed] to 'disrupt' and 'neutralize'
target groups and individuals.., on the theory that preventing the growth of
dangerous groups and the propagation of dangerous ideas would protect the
national security and deter violence."' 45
As with earlier FBI surveillance operations, the targets of its
COINTELPRO operations expanded over time. Beginning with the CPUSA
in 1956,146 the COINTELPRO programs grew to include the Socialist Workers
Party, the civil rights movement, White hate groups, Black nationalist groups,
140. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK III, supra note 83, at 430. The FBI maintained a
"Security Index" of persons who were potentially dangerous to the United States in the event of a crisis.
The list included not only known domestic communists but also suspected communist sympathizers. Id.
at 436-38. By 1951, the list contained over 13,000 names; by 1954, it contained over 26,000 names. Id. at
440,446.
141. Id. at 448.
142. Id. at 449; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 272-73. By 1960, the FBI had opened at least 432,000
files on "subversive" individuals and groups. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK MI1, supra note 83,
at 451.
143. Id. at 448; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 272-73. See also Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney
General, 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
144. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK Il, supra note 83, at 4. COINTELPRO is an acronym
for "counterintelligence program."
145. Id. at 3.
146. The COINTELPRO operation against the CPUSA was not a dramatic departure from past
practices but merely a "formalization of previous harassment of the [CPUSA] which had been directed by
the FBI on an ad hoc basis for a number of years." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 407.
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and "new left" groups, a broadly defined category of organizations including
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Students for a Democratic
Society, and the National Organization for Women.'47 The breadth of the
investigations was staggering--over COINTELPRO's life the FBI opened
2,000 separate investigations.'48  It was also indiscriminate. Anything
remotely considered to be subversive justified an investigation, even some-
thing as trivial as writing a letter to a newspaper supporting protests against
censorship.' 49
The FBI's COINTELPRO tactics went far beyond surveillance, reliance
on informers and illegal searchers, although those familiar techniques were
part of its arsenal. COINTELPRO also included actions designed to harass
targets, such as:
attempts to disrupt marriages, to stir factionalism within and between
dissident groups, to have dissidents fired from jobs and ousted by
landlords, to prevent protestors from speaking and protest groups
from forming, to have derogatory material planted in the press or
among acquaintances of targets, to interfere with peaceful
demonstrations and deny facilities for meetings and conferences, to
cause funding cut-offs to dissident groups, to prevent the distribution
of literature and to get local police to arrest targets for alleged
criminal law violations. 50
The FBI's tactics had a corrosive effect, chilling First Amendment expression
by groups' 5 ' and destroying individual lives.'52 They rarely, however, pro-
147. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK Ia supra note 83, at 15-24, 50-58.
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id. at 27. Approximately 18 percent of the FBI's total COINTELPRO operations were directed
at groups simply for their First Amendment expression. id. at 28.
150. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 470. See also CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK III, supra
note 83, at 34-61; Saito, supra note 107, at 1082-86.
151. SENATE SELECTCOMM. To STUDY GOVERNMENTOPERATIONS wrrH RESPECTTOINTELLIGENCE
ACTIvITIEs, FINAL REPORT: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 755,
94th Cong., Bk IM 17 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK II].
152. See, e.g., GENTRY, supra note 83, at 444 (noting thenumber of suicides and stress-related deaths
of FBI targets); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 471 (noting FBI actions resulted in break-up of marriage);
id. at 525 (noting that tactics caused the individual to flee the town in fear of his life). Despite the harm
caused, the FBI justified its tactics as necessary to win the "war" against subversion. As William Sullivan,
assistant director of the FBI explained:
"Ihis is a rough, tough, dirty business, and dangerous. It was dangerous at times. No holds
were barred.... We have used (these techniques] against Soviet agents. They have used
[them] against us .... [These same methods were brought] home against any organization
against which we were targeted. We did not differentiate. This is a rough, tough business."
CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK HI, supra note 83, at 7 (alteration in original) (quoting William C.
Sullivan, testimony to Congress dated 11/1/75).
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vided advance knowledge of illegal activity or information leading to prosecu-
tions for violation of the law.'53
The FBI's surveillance of domestic groups, while most extensive during
the 1960s, was not the only government surveillance during this period. The
CIA also engaged in a number of domestic intelligence activities, including
mail openings and surveillance of domestic groups thought to be radical or
subject to foreign influence. "S Military intelligence also gathered intelligence
on civilian political activity, ostensibly to protect against domestic disorder. 55
Federal authorities encouraged local law enforcement to gather intelligence
about dissident organizations. 56 As with the FBI, the scope of such
investigations was expansive, including organizations involved in "completely
peaceful and lawful activity."' 57 Such investigations also rarely garnered
valuable information regarding threats.'58
2. Attempted Reform
As the federal government's abuse of intelligence-gathering came to light
in the 1970s, Congress began to investigate. The Church and Pike com-
mittees, in the Senate and House respectively, mounted lengthy investigations
of the intelligence community.59 Although the Church Committee produced
a detailed report regarding government abuse of intelligence gathering,' 6
politics prevented either committee from directly bringing about reform.' 6' In
1976, however, the Senate established a permanent committee regarding
intelligence operations. 162 The House created such a committee in 1977.63
While the committees provide some oversight regarding intelligence
153. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 465 (citing GAO report).
154. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK 1I, supra note 151, at 96-104; GOLDSTEIN, supra note
71, at 454-57.
155. CHURCH COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK IL supra note 151, at 77, 84; GOLDSTEIN, supra note
71, at 457-59.
156. CHURCH COMM., BOOK M, supra note 151, at 77.
157. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 458; see also CHURCH COMM. BOOK II, supra note 151, at 213.
158. One congressional committee, for example, noted that military surveillance of domestic groups
was "utterly useless." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 459.
159. KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT 2 (1996). For in-depth
discussions on the activities of the committees, see id. at 81-143.
160. See supra notes 83 & 151.
161. For a discussion of the politics surrounding both committees and executive branch attempts to
discredit them, see generally OLMSTED, supra note 159.
162. Id. at 175-76; see also LOCH K. JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY: CONGRESS AND
INTELLIGENCE (1988).
163. FRANK J. SMIST, JR., CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
1947-89, 214-15 (1990).
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activities'" reformers fell short of establishing comprehensive statutory
authority regarding intelligence activities. 6 '
Congress did enact the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA")
in 1978 in order to constrain federal wiretapping authority in certain foreign
intelligence investigations.'66 FISA authorized wiretaps in those situations
under lesser standards than required in criminal investigations or intelligence
investigations of purely domestic threats.'6 7 The statute allowed intelligence
officials to wiretap persons in the United States only if officials certified to a
special court that they had "probable cause" to believe the person was a
foreign power or agent of a foreign power, that the target was conducting
activities that may violate U.S. criminal law, and that the wiretap would be
conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information.'
68
Thus, FISA, while allowing electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence
investigations on U.S. soil, nevertheless provided oversight for the decision
to wiretap, which had previously been grounded solely in the executive
branch.
During the 1970s the executive branch also took steps to reform its
domestic intelligence gathering activities, primarily to undercut legislative
efforts at reform.169 In 1976, Attorney General Edward Levi issued a set of
guidelines governing the FBI's domestic security investigations. 70 A
response to the abuses of the past, the guidelines "were designed to focus such
investigations solely on possible criminal activity and to prevent the bureau
from engaging in open-ended investigations of 'subversives' and 'dissidents'
generally.''. Accordingly, the guidelines allowed the FBI to open domestic
164. Some observers have noted that by centralizing oversight authority and reducing the number of
people involved, the creation of a permanent committee was a "victory for secrecy." OLMSTED, supra note
159, at 176 (citation omitted).
165. Some scholars argue that the entire point of the Church committee was to develop legislation
for the intelligence community that would restrict certain activities. JOHNSON, supra note 162, at 227;
SMIST, supra note 163, at 84. Congress "abandoned the effort to enact a comprehensive intelligence
charter" in the 1980s. SMIST, supra note 163, at 84.
166. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2001). The Senate Report regarding FISA indicates that it is a direct
response to abuse revealed during congressional investigations of the intelligence community. S. REP. No.
95-1267, 95th Cong., 8-9 (1978).
167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v. United States District Court, 407
U.S. 297 (1972).
168. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a)(3); 1801(b)(2)(A); 1804(a)(7)(B). For a thorough discussion of FISA
prior to the USA Patriot Act amendments in 2001, see William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive
Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 74-91 (2000).
169. See OLMSTED, supra note 159, at 173.
170. Domestic Security Investigation Guidelines (1976), reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter:
Hearings on S. 1612 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 18-26 (1978) [hereinafter
Levi Guidelines].
171. Stone, supra note 129, at 276.
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security investigations only to ascertain information on groups or individuals
whose activities might involve violence and the violation of federal law.' 1
72
The Levi guidelines contemplated three levels of investigations: pre-
liminary, limited and full. Preliminary investigations could be instigated only
upon the basis of "allegations or other information" that the target might be
engaged in unlawful activities involving the use of force or violence.' Such
investigations were confined to ascertaining "whether there [was] a factual
basis for opening a full investigation" and were limited to 90 days unless
longer periods were approved by FBI headquarters. '74 The guidelines further
limited surveillance techniques in preliminary investigations to review of
existing FBI files, existing law enforcement records, public records, and other
established sources of information.'75 Physical surveillance and interviews
were allowed only to identify the subject of an investigation and more
intrusive forms of surveillance, such as mail covers, mail openings, electronic
surveillance, and recruitment of new informants were expressly prohibited. 76
The Levi guidelines allowed "limited" investigations only when a pre-
liminary investigation was "inadequate to determine if there is a factual basis
for a full investigation." As with preliminary investigations, limited investi-
gations were confined to 90 days. Surveillance tools available to investigators
were also confined to those listed above with two additions: Investigators
could use physical surveillance and interviews for purposes other than
identifying the subject of the investigation.'77
The Levi guidelines allowed the FBI to conduct full investigations when
there existed "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an
individual or a group is or may be engaged" in unlawful activities involving
the use of force or violence.'78 The guidelines further directed investigators
to consider the magnitude of the threatened harm, its likelihood, the
immediacy of the threat, and the danger to privacy and free expression posed
by opening an investigation.' Full investigations could be conducted for up
to one year without approval of the Department of Justice. 8° Investigators
were allowed to use more intrusive techniques such as electronic surveillance
and mail covers but only in limited circumstances.' 8'
172. Levi Guidelines, supra note 170, § I(A).
173. Id. § 1(C).
174. Id.; id. § 1(H).
175. Id. § II(E).
176. Id. § 19(G).
177. Id. § 11(F)-(H).
178. Id. § 11(I)
179. Id.
180. Id. § me(C).
181. Id. § 11(J).
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Although the Levi guidelines served merely as an internal document and
were not judicially enforceable, they had an immediate effect.'82 The number
of security investigations instituted by the FBI fell from 4,868 before the
guidelines to 26 in 1981 and the latter all involved organizations involved in
violent activities.183
In 1983, however, at the behest of critics who believed that the guidelines
hampered the FBI's law enforcement capabilities,' 84 William French Smith,
Attorney General under Ronald Reagan, issued new guidelines. The Smith
guidelines eliminated preliminary and limited investigations solely for
domestic security purposes, a move that some saw as more potentially restric-
tive than the Levi guidelines.'85 The Smith guidelines, however, allowed full
investigations to be instituted when "facts or circumstances reasonably indi-
cated that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of
furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that
involve force or violence."' 86 Such a standard was admittedly lower than the
requirement of "specific and articulable facts" found in the Levi guidelines.1
87
The Smith guidelines further allowed the FBI to open investigations based
upon a group's advocacy of criminal activity "unless it is apparent, from the
circumstances or the context in which the statements [were] made, that there
182. For a discussion of the legal effect of the guidelines, see John T. Elliff, The Attorney General's
Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 785, 786-92 (1984).
183. Stone, supra note 129, at 277; see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT OF THE
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, FBI DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: AN
UNCERTAIN FUTURE 22 (1977).
184. Stone, supra note 129, at 277-78; Athan Theoharis, Conservative Politics and Surveillance:
The Cold War, the Reagan Administration, and the FBI, in FREEDOM AT RISK, supra note 60, at 259,265-
66.
185. Elliff, supra note 182, at 804-5. The Smith guidelines placed preliminary investigations under
the auspices of "general crimes" authority, which allowed such investigations where "responsible handling
require[d] some further scrutiny ... in response to... allegation[s] or information indicating the possibility
of criminal activity." The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and
Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations § II(B)(1) (1983), reprinted in 32 CRIM L. REP. (BNA) 3087-93
(1983) [hereinafter Smith Guidelines]. The consolidation of preliminary inquiries did not eliminate them
for intelligence purposes. The guidelines make clear that preliminary inquiries can be used as the basis for
full criminal or intelligence investigations. Id. § .Such inquiries were still limited to 90 days without
additional approval and mail covers, mail openings, and electronic surveillance were still prohibited. Id.
§ fl(B)(3)-(5).
186. Smith Guidelines, supra note 185, § M(B)(1).
187. Elliff, supra note 182, at 799; Stone, supra note 129, at 278-79. The Smith Guidelines,
however, allowed investigations to continue only for 180 days without authorization from high-level FBI
officials. Smith Guidelines, supra note 185, § I11(B)(4)(b). As with the Levi guidelines, a wide variety of
investigative techniques were allowed in full investigations although officials were admonished to consider
"whether the information could be obtained in a timely and effective way by less intrusive means." Id. §
IV(A).
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[was] no prospect of harm."'" Some critics charged that the Smith guidelines
represented a"reexpansion of the FBI's authority to investigate domestic 'sub-
version."" 9 The Smith guidelines remained in force in somewhat amended
form until 2002. "9
The Reagan administration expanded the FBI's ability to instigate domes-
tic security investigations in other ways. In 1981, President Reagan issued
Executive Order 12,333 regarding intelligence activities within the United
States. '' That order allowed intelligence agencies to use intrusive
surveillance techniques against domestic groups, including electronic
surveillance, warrantless searches, and group infiltration. Although the order
ostensibly allowed such techniques only when used to collect information
related to a foreign intelligence investigation, critics have noted that its
breadth could include surveillance of purely domestic groups. 192 The order,
in somewhat amended form, remains in force.
I. CURRENT POWERS PERTAINING TO INFORMATION CONTROL
The September lth terrorist attacks and the on-going war against
terrorism, as arguably the most significant national security crisis in decades,
have again spurred the government to take control of information. While this
effort is still in its nascency, the discussion below reveals that many of the
government's recent efforts are strikingly similar to its historical pattern of
information control.
A. Government Control of Confidential Information
On March 25, 2003, President Bush signed Executive Order 13,292,' 9
which amended the pre-existing order signed by President Clinton 94 and
expanded the government's ability to keep information secret. The Bush order
gives the government greater leeway to designate material as classified for
188. Smith Guidelines, supra note 185, at § I.
189. Stone, supra note 129, at 279.
190. Attorney General Richard Thornburg issued new guidelines in 1989 but they were substantially
similar to the Smith Guidelines. The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (1989), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/agl
readingroom/generalcrimea.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Thornburg Guidelines].
191. Exec. Order No. 12,333,46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 8, 1981).
192. Autin, supra note 60, at 74-75; Theoharis, supra note 184, at 269.
193. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 (Mar. 28, 2003).
194. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (Apr. 20, 1995).
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longer periods of time'95 and to reclassify previously released information.'96
It also broadens the government's ability to exempt from automatic disclosure
certain categories of information by requiring only that the government show
that the information "could" hurt national security if released.'97 Finally, the
Bush order removed several provisions of Clinton's previous order designed
to protect against excessive secrecy by requiring that information be disclosed
or classified at the lowest level if there existed doubt about the propriety of
classification.'98 As one commentator noted, these "seemingly minor dele-
tion[s]" will likely promote greater secrecy by "changing the 'default' setting
from 'do not classify' to 'classify." ' 99 The Bush administration's 14 percent
increase in classification actions in 2001 to 2002, the year prior to Bush's
order, supports they argument.
200
The Bush administration also tended toward secrecy in its interpretation
of FOIA requests. Almost immediately after the September 11 th attacks,
Attorney General John Ashcroft encouraged agency heads to withhold
discretionary information in response to FOIA requests. 20 1 Within a few
months, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card further directed agencies
to expansively interpret FOIA exemptions to withhold "sensitive but
unclassified" data202-material which is not automatically exempted from
disclosure in response to FOIA requests.20 3 These memos generated criticism.
195. Compare Exec. Order No. 13292 § 1.5 with Exec. Order No. 12,958 § 1.6.
196. Compare Exec. Order No. 13292 § 1.7(c) with Exec. Order No. 12,958 § 1.6(c).
197. Exec. Order No. 13,292 § 3.3(b). The Clinton order allowed exemption only if release of such
information "should" be expected to harm national security. Exec. Order No. 12,958 § 3.3(b).
198. See Exec. Order No. 12,958 §§ 1.2(b), 1.3(c).
199. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Assessing the New Normal: Liberty and Security for
the Post-September 11 United States 6 (2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uslaw/loss/
assessing/assessingnewnormal.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Assessing the New Normal].
200. Id. at 2.
201. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to all heads of federal departments and
agencies (October 12, 2001), available at http://www.doi.gov/foia/foia.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2004).
Ashcroft's directive specifically noted that the Department of Justice would defend agency decisions unless
they "lack[ed] a sound legal basis or presentfed] an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of
other agencies to protect other important records." Id. His directive thus reversed a previous "presumption
of disclosure" with respect to agency information. Assessing the New Normal, supra note 199, at 89 n.14.
202. Memorandum from White House Chief of Staff, Andrew H. Card, Jr. to the heads of executive
departments and agencies (Mar. 19,2002), available at httpJ/www.fas.org/sgp/bush/wh03l902.html (last
visited Aug. 11, 2004). Congress also acted regarding "sensitive but unclassified" information, directing
the President to "identify and safeguard homeland security information that is sensitive but unclassified."
Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 892(a)(1)(B), 6 U.S.C.A. § 482(a)(l)(B) (West Supp. 2004).
203. For more in-depth discussion of the Bush administration's directives see, Kristen Elizabeth Uhl,
Comment, The Freedom of Information Act Post -9/11: Balancing the Public's Right to Know, Critical
Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security, 53 Am. U. L. REv. 261,272-74 (2003); Keith Anderson,
Note, Is there Still a "Sound Legal Basis?": The Freedom of Information Act in the Post 9-11 World, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 1605, 1621-28 (2003).
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Some argued that Ashcroft's memo would exacerbate agencies' already
abysmal responses to FOLA requests, making discoverable information even
harder to obtain than before the terrorist attacks. 2' The scientific community,
whose research is potentially subject to the "sensitive but unclassified"
restriction, also argued about the dangers of using that term, noting that it has
never been adequately defined and that there exist no administrative
mechanisms to challenge government secrecy determinations.2 5
In 2002, at the White House's behest, Congress broadened the govern-
ment's powers to withhold information under FOIA by adding a "critical
infrastructure exemption" that specifically allows agencies to withhold infor-
mation voluntarily submitted to it by private entities "regarding the security
of critical infrastructure and protected systems, analysis, warning, inter-
dependency study, recovery, reconstitution, or other informational purpose."2"
The new exemption has also been widely criticized, with commentators
arguing that its breadth allows business and industry to hide wrongdoing by
submitting information regarding public hazards to the government under the
guise of "critical infrastructure" information.2 °7 Commentators are also con-
cerned that the new legislation allows criminal punishment of government
officials who reveal such information even if they do so as "whistleblowers"
trying to protect the public interest. 208
There have been other, related signs of increased government secrecy
following the terrorist attacks. Within weeks of September 11, 2001, govern-
ment agencies removed non-classified information from their websites
204. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Homefront Confidential: Freedom of
Information 1-3 (4th ed. 2003), available at http://www.rcfp.org/homefrontconfidential/foi.html (last
visited Aug. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Homefront Confidential, Freedom of Information]. For a history of
agency resistance to FOIA requests, see FOERSTEL, supra note 45, at 1-72, 99-114.
205. See Knezo, supra note 61, at 30-35; Patrice McDermott, Withhold and Control: Information
in the Bush Administration, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671,675-76 (2003). But see Anderson, supra note
203, at 1622-28. For a discussion of the practical impact of the Ashcroft and Card memos on agency FOIA
practice, see The National Security Archive, The Ashcroft Memo: "Drastic" Change or "More Thunder
than Lightning?," (2003), available at http://www.gwu.edul%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBBINSAEBB84/index
.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2004) [hereinafter National Security Archive, The Ashcroft Memo].
206. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 214, 6 U.S.C.A. § 133(a)(1). Federal law defines "critical
infrastructure" as "systems, assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." 42 U.S.C. §
5195c(e) (Supp. 12003).
207. Uhl, supra note 203, at 280-81; Assessing the New Normal, supra note 199, at 5-6; Press
Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Says Freedom of Information Act Exemptions For Private
Industry Would Endanger Public Safety (July 24, 2002), available at
http://archive.aclu.orgtnews/2002/nO72402a.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2004).
208. Uhl, supra note 203, at 277. See Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 214(0, 6 U.S.C. § 133(f).
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"because of its possible usefulness to terrorists."2" During the summer of
2002, the Bush administration also refused to reveal information regarding its
implementation of the USA Patriot Act in response to congressional questions,
only doing so after Congress threatened to subpoena the information. Even
then, the administration asserted that much of the material was classified.21°
Secrecy with respect to quasi-judicial proceedings has also increased. In
October, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a memo
providing for blanket closures of all immigration proceedings deemed to be
of "special interest., 211 The government also refused to reveal the names and
identities of persons detained in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist
attacks, claiming that dissemination of such information would interfere with
an on-going law enforcement investigation. 12 Finally, in November 2001,
President Bush signed Executive Order 13,233, which expands the ability of
sitting and incumbent presidents to delay release of presidential records from
the national archives.213
Furthermore, the Bush administration has aggressively tried to preempt
disclosure of information by threatening criminal punishment or refusing to
share information with Congress. In October 2001, President Bush reduced
the number of congressional officials allowed to attend intelligence briefings,
allegedly because of leaks regarding potential future terrorist attacks.214 In the
Summer of 2002, the White House further requested that congressional
officials produce documents and take lie detector tests to determine if they had
209. Homefront Confidential, Freedom of Information, supra note 204, at 20.
210. Assessing the New Normal, supra note 199, at 8-9.
211. Id. at 12. This move was upheld by the Third Circuit in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2003) but struck down by the Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Ci. 2002). For discussion of other secrecy issues surrounding quasi-judicial
proceedings, see Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Homefront Confidential: Access to
Terrorism and Immigration Proceedings 9-17 (4th ed. 2003), available at http://www.rcfp.org/homefront
confidential/immigration.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004).
212. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States DOJ, 331 F.3d 918, 923 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The
majority ruled in the government's favor over a vociferous dissent by Judge David Tatel, who argued that
the government's argument was "vague" and "poorly reasoned." Id. at 937 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
213. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56025 (Nov. 15, 2001). For commentary on the order,
see Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government: The Convergence of Constitutional
and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
651 (2003); Marcy Lynn Karin, Out of Sight, But Not Out of Mind: How Executive Order 13,233 Expands
Executive Privilege While Simultaneously Preventing Access to Presidential Records, 55 STAN. L. REV.
529 (2002).
214. Dana Milbank & Peter Slevin, Bush Edict on Briefings Irks Hill; White House Stems
Information Flow, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 29160567 (last visited Aug.
14, 2004).
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leaked information regarding the September 1 Ith attacks.215 Many congress-
persons objected, claiming that the measures were coercive and a violation of
separation of powers.1 6 In October, 2002, the Department of Justice
announced a policy of aggressively enforcing existing laws to prevent dis-
closures of classified information and suggested that a new law criminalizing
disclosures generally, not simply in the espionage context, might be helpful.
217
B. Government Control of Public Information
The Bush administration has attempted to control public information as
well. As discussed below, although some of the Bush administration's actions
involve direct repression, the bulk of them involve more informal, indirect
censorship.
1. Direct Censorship
The primary potential weapons of direct censorship involve expanded
federal laws criminalizing (1) "material support" of terrorism and (2)
"domestic terrorism." The material support laws allow prosecution and
deportation of individuals providing "material support" to terrorist groups (as
designated by the State Department).2 8 Such support includes provision of
weapons, physical assets, transportation, expert advice, monetary assistance,
training and personnel.1 9 The laws do not require that the defendant intend
to further terrorism; it is enough that one's actions support terrorism
regardless of one's intent. Civil libertarians are greatly concerned about the
sweeping nature of such laws. As one commentator pointed out,
[u]nder this law, it would be a crime for a Quaker to send a book on
Ghandi's theory of non-violence-a "physical asset"-to the leader
215. Laura A. White, Note, The Need for Governmental Secrecy: Why the U.S. Government Must
Be Able to Withhold Information in the Interest of National Security, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1071, 1095-96
(2003).
216. Id.; Editorial, The Danger of Leak Probes, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2002, at A16.
217. Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, to Congress and the President
(Oct. 2002), available at http:/lwww.fas.orglsgp/othergov/dojleaks.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004).
218. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(A)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (West Supp. 2002); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (West 2000 &
Supp. 2002). Commentators note that the "targeting of material support to terrorist organizations is the
linchpin of the government's current war on terror." David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating
History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 (2003); see also Nancy Chang & Alan
Kabat, Summary of Recent Court Rulings on Terrorism-Related Matters Having Civil Liberties
Implications 16-27 (Feb. 4, 2004) (listing prosecutions under the material support laws), available at
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reportslreport.asp?ObjID=-n7yKoAObvc&Content=324 (ast visited Aug. 12,
2004).
219. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b) (West Supp. 2002).
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of a terrorist organization in hopes of persuading him to forgo vio-
lence.... Similarly, if this law had been on the books in the 1980s,
the thousands of Americans who donated money to the African
National Congress (ANC) for its lawful political struggle against
apartheid would face lengthy prison terms, because during those years
the ANC was designated as a terrorist organization by our State
Department.22°
The laws essentially punish individuals merely because of their association
with certain groups regardless of the individual's lawful motives. Thus, critics
liken the material support laws to Cold War era tactics, when government
officials used lists of subversive organizations and prosecutions of their
members to wipe out undesirable elements. 2
Federal laws allowing prosecution of "domestic terrorism" have also
been much criticized. The USA Patriot Act amended the existing definition
of domestic terrorism to include, in addition to acts of violence normally
associated with terrorism, any criminal activity within the United States that
"involve[s] acts dangerous to human life.... ; appear[s] to be intended to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; [or] to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion. 222 Critics have argued that such an
expansive definition of domestic terrorism may result in suppression of
legitimate dissent. As one commentator noted:
Vigorous protest activities, by their very nature, could be construed
as acts that "appear to be intended ... to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion." Further, clashes between
demonstrators and police officers and acts of civil disobedience-even
those that do not result in injuries and are entirely non-violent-could
be construed as "dangerous to human life" and in "violation of
criminal laws.
223
Commentators are particularly concerned that organizations known for their
aggressive protests-e.g., anti-abortion, environmental, animal rights activists
-might be subject to labeling as terrorist organizations.224
220. Cole, supra note 218, at 10.
221. Id. at 6-15.
222. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (Supp. 12003).
223. Nancy Chang, The USA Patriot Act: What's So Patriotic About Trampling on the Bill of
Rights? 3 (2001), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/USA PATRIOTACT.pdf (last
visited Aug. 14, 2004).
224. John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland
Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department's Anti-terrorism
Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1093 (2002) ("Conceivably, these extensions of the definition of
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In addition to the potential for censorship under new USA Patriot Act
provisions, some reports indicate increased harassment of protestors and
attempts to suppress criticism of the government's policies on terrorism and
the war in Iraq. According to these reports, cities have denied or delayed
permits for rallies, restricted protestors to areas far from public view, or
harassed protestors with arrests and interrogations regarding political affilia-
tions and prior protest activities."' Other officials have used their subpoena
power to harass protestors, requiring them to testify before grand juries and
requiring that organizations turn over membership lists of groups participating
in peaceful protests.226
2. Indirect Censorship
The Bush administration has also engaged in acts of indirect censorship.
In an effort to quash dissent, government officials have accused its critics of
lack of patriotism. Thus, Attorney General John Ashcroft, in testimony before
the Senate Judiciary Committee proclaimed that:
We need honest, reasoned debate; not fearmongering. To those who
pit Americans against immigrants, and citizens against non-citizens; to
those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty; my
'terrorist' could bring within their sweep diverse domestic political groups which have been accused of acts
of intimidation or property damage such as Act Up, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA),
Operation Rescue, and the Vieques demonstrators."); Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, How the USA Patriot
Act Will Permit Governmental Infringement Upon the Privacy ofAmericans in the Name of "Intelligence"
Investigations, 150 U. PA. L REV. 1651, 1689 (2002) (noting that the definition of domestic terrorism
"encompasses activities ranging from those of anti-abortion activists who use violence against women
entering Planned Parenthood clinics, to World Trade Organization protesters who throw rocks through the
windows of merchants and politicians who publicly support the WTO.").
225. See generally American Civil Liberties Union, Freedom Under Fire: Dissent in Post-
9/1 lAmerica (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id= 12580 (ast visited Aug. 14,
2004); Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of New Mexico Sues Albuquerque Police
Over Mistreatment of Peaceful Protestors (Mar. 22, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/FreeSpeech/
FreeSpeech.cfm?ID=15288&c=86 (last visited Aug. 14, 2004).
226. In a February 2004 incident in Iowa, for example, the U.S. attorney issued grand jury subpoenas
to individual protestors who organized and attended an anti-war forum and related peaceful protest and to
Drake University, in whose facilities the forum was held. The subpoenas were served by an official asso-
ciated with the local anti-terrorism task force and ordered the protestors to testify before a grand jury regard-
ing an unidentified law enforcement investigation. The subpoena to Drake University also requested that
the university turn over all records concerning the National Lawyer's Guild, who had sponsored the forum,
and any identities of persons attending the event. The local U.S. Attorney eventually withdrew the sub-
poenas after massive public outcry. See Leonard Post, A Furor Over Iowa Subpoenas; Amid Howls of
Protest, a U.S. Attorney Backs Down; Suits to Follow?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 2004, at 4; Jeff Eckhoff &
Mark Siebert, U.S. Officials Drop Activist Subpoenas; Judge Lifts Drake Gag Order in Probe ofAnti-war
Protest, DES MOINES REGISTER, Feb. 11, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WL 60231472 (last visited Aug. 14,
2004).
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message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists-for they erode our
national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to
America's enemies, and pause to America's friends. They encourage
people of good will to remain silent in the face of evil.227
Private, right-wing organizations closely tied to the government also
implied that critics of the Bush administration's war on terror were
unpatriotic. The American Council of Trustees and Alumni, for example,
published a report in November 2001, claiming that college faculty who
criticized the Bush administration were the "weak link in America's response
to the [September 11 th] attack. ' 228 The report implied that liberal college
faculty as a whole were out-of-step with American's otherwise patriotic
response:
While America's elected officials from both parties and media com-
mentators from across the spectrum condemned the attacks and
followed the President in calling evil by its rightful name, many
faculty demurred. Some refused to make judgments. Many invoked
tolerance and diversity as antidotes to evil. Some even pointed
accusatory fingers, not at terrorists, but at America itself.
229
The report further published an appendix with quotations attributed to
identified faculty members, thus reaching into the realm of stigmatization so
heavily relied upon during the Cold War years.230
The Bush administration has also apparently relied on propaganda as a
tool of information control. Less than a month after the September 11 th
attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft urged the Senate to adopt the Bush
administration's proposals expanding its law enforcement powers, noting that
[tihe American people do not have the luxury of unlimited time in
erecting the necessary defenses to future or further terrorist acts. The
danger that darkened the United States of America and the civilized
227. DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms while Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Attorney General John
Ashcroft), available at 2001 WL 26188084 (last visited Aug. 14, 2004).
228. American Association of Trustees and Alumni, Defending Civilization: How Our Universities
are Failing America and What Can Be Done About It 1 (2001), available at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/
-aaron/defciv.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2004). The organization is the brainchild of Vice President
Cheney's wife, Lynne Cheney.
229. Id.; see also id. at 5 ("The fact remains that academe is the only sector of American society that
is distinctly divided in its response").
230. Id. at 8-38.
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world on September 11 did not pass with the atrocities committed that
day. Terrorism is a clear and present danger to Americans today. l
Reference to "clear and present danger"-language that strikes a cord with
many Americans232 -was a powerful rhetorical tool designed to spark fear and
galvanize support for passage of the administration's proposed USA Patriot
Act, which was then pending before Congress.
Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh, the primary author of the USA
Patriot Act, similarly relied on fear-inducing images of terrorists as monsters
to galvanize support for expansion of government powers:
[The] enemy we face [is] a criminal whose objective is not crime but
fear; a mass murderer who kills only as a means to a greater end; a
predator whose victims are all innocent civilians; a warrior who
exploits the rule of war; a war criminal who recognizes no boundaries
and who reaches all comers of the world. To confront this threat, the
Department of Justice needed a fundamentally new paradigm,
different from the way we approached the traditional task of law
enforcement. Unlike traditional soldiers, terrorists wage war dressed
not in camouflage, but in the colors of street clothing. Unlike tradi-
tional criminals, terrorists are willing to sacrifice their own lives in
order to take the lives of innocents.233
In another setting, he argued:
The enemy we confront is a multinational network of evil that is
fanatically committed to the slaughter of innocents. Unlike enemies
that we have faced in past wars, this one operates cravenly, in dis-
guise. It may operate through so-called "sleeper" cells, sending
terrorist agents into potential target areas, where they may assume
outwardly normal identities, waiting months, sometimes years, before
springing into action to carry out or assist terrorist attacks. And
unlike garden-variety criminals the Department has investigated and
prosecuted in the past, terrorists are willing to give up their own lives
to take the lives of thousands of innocent citizens. We cannot afford
to wait for them to execute their plans; the death toll is too high; the
231. Hearing on "Homeland Defense" Before the United States Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft), available at 2001 WL 1132689 (last
visited Aug. 15, 2004).
232. Douglas Laycock, The Clear and Present Danger Test, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 161 (2000).
233. Conference Proceedings, Life After 9/11: Issues Affecting the Courts and the Nation, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 219, 222 (2003) (comments of Viet Dinh).
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consequences too great. We must neutralize terrorists before they
strike.2
3 4
Such rhetoric harkens back to past crises in which executive officials
described the victims of their actions as sly, devious and secretive puppets of
foreign powers.235 To be sure, terrorists do have many of the characteristics
Dinh describes but that does not justify the government's actions. The
government has been concerned about and asking for expanded law enforce-
ment powers regarding terrorism since the 1970s, making it hardly the new
and pressing threat that Dinh conjures. Thus, Dinh's characterization, while
partly true, serves more to create an unthinking fearful response rather than to
add neutral information to the public debate. Such is the purpose of pro-
paganda and one rightly views these statements with a measure of skepticism.
Critics of the Bush administration have pointed out other incidents of
potential propaganda. Some argue, for example, that the government's
"Terror Alert" system-a color coded system designed to warn Americans
regarding the terrorist threat level-is a propaganda tool.2 6 Others have
pointed to the Bush administration's attempts to galvanize support for the war
on Iraq by claiming that Sadam Hussein had ties to Al-Quaeda and was
developing weapons of mass destruction. As the war unfolded and informa-
tion became available, many observers began to question the veracity of those
statements, ultimately concluding that the Bush administration deliberately
lied to win support for the war.237  Finally, some observers have labeled
Justice Department officials' tour of the United States to galvanize support for
the USA Patriot Act as a disinformation campaign designed to quell criticism
of government's expanded law enforcement powers. 238
234. Viet D. Dinh, Freedom and Security after September 1, 25 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 399,400-
401 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
235. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
236. After a flurry of terrorist warnings in December 2003 resulted in heightened anxiety, and delayed
or rerouted international flights, but no arrests or detentions of terrorists, some people noted that the system
was more effective as a tool for diverting public opinion from other administration actions than for warning
citizens of possible danger. See Michael Chossudovsky, Bush's Christmas Terror Alert, Dec. 24, 2003,
available at http:llwww.globalresearch.calarticles/CHO312D.html (last visited Aug. 14,2004). Aside from
the propaganda argument, many critics of the terror alert system argue for its overhaul simply because it
appears not to be working. Michael lsikoff & Mark Hosenball, No More Orange, Yellow and Red?, NEWS-
WEEK, Jan. 14, 2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3959828/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2004).
237. Christopher Scheer et al., Bush's Lies About Iraq, THE NATION, Mar. 29, 2004, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040329&s=scheer (last visited Aug. 14, 2004); Richard Morin
& Dana Millbank, Poll Finds Distrust of Bush on Iraq, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 2004, at A26, available
at 2004 WL 59771706 (last visited Aug. 14. 2004).
238. See generally American Civil liberties Union, Seeking Truthfrom Justice: Patriot Propaganda
- The Justice Department's Campaign to Mislead the Public About the USA PATRIOTAct (July 2003),
available at http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=13098 (last visited Aug. 14, 2004).
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C. Government Information Gathering
In the last few years the Bush administration has also expanded its
surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities through amendments to
FISA and executive initiatives.
In October 2001, at the behest of the Bush administration, Congress
passed the USA Patriot Act which expanded the government's existing
surveillance capabilities under FISA. Section 218 of the USA Patriot Act, for
example, has eroded the wall between foreign-intelligence gathering and law
enforcement erected under the earlier Act.239 Under the USA Patriot Act
amendments, the FBI can now obtain wiretaps under FISA standards (lower
than probable cause) if they certify that the collection of foreign intelligence
is a "significant purpose" of the investigation, rather than the "primary"
purpose as required under the old standards.24 This standard allows the FBI
to evade traditional Fourth Amendment probable cause requirements simply
by asserting that investigations at least partly have foreign intelligence
purposes.24'
Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act allows the government to obtain any
"tangible thing" regarding any person if it certifies to the FISA Court that such
items are "sought for" a foreign intelligence investigation.242 The law
explicitly forbids persons/entities producing such things from revealing that
the FBI has sought them.243 Section 215 has caused much controversy as its
provisions vastly expand the government's authority to obtain library,
bookstore, medical, and educational records regarding persons who are not
244involved in terrorist activities. Prior to the amendment, the government
could obtain only records pertaining to certain businesses and it had to certify
to the FISA Court that it sought such information based upon "specific and
239. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
240. USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 218, 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (Supp. 12003).
241. See Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to the Director of the FBI and other
senior Justice Department officials on Intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign Intelligence and Foreign
Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted by the FBI (Mar. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/agO3O6O2.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) (noting that the USA
Patriot Act "allows FISA to be used primarily for a law enforcement purpose, as long as a significant
foreign intelligence purpose remains") (emphasis in original). For a more detailed explanation of USA
Patriot Act § 218, see Assessing the New Normal, supra note 199, at 18-20.
242. USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
243. Id.
244. For criticism of Section 215, see Kathryn Martin, Note, The USA Patriot Act's Application to
Library Patron Records, 29 J. LEGIS. 283 (2003); Assessing the New Normal, supra note 199, at 17;
American Civil liberties Union, Unpatriotic Acts: The FBI's Power to Rifle Through Your Records and
Personal Belongings Without Telling You 2-9 (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/
Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=13245 (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Unpatriotic Acts].
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articulable facts" that the target of the order was an agent of a foreign
power.245
Amendments under the USA Patriot Act and the Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2004 also expand the government's ability to issue
"national security letters" to obtain certain information regarding U.S.
2461tcitizens. Prior to the amendments, the FBI could use national security
letters in foreign intelligence investigations to obtain records from financial
institutions (banks, credit unions, etc.) if there were "specific and articulable
facts" giving reason to believe that the person about whom records were
sought was an agent of a foreign power. The amendments, however, allow the
government to obtain information about any person simply by certifying that
it is "sought for" foreign intelligence purposes.247 Moreover, they broaden the
definition of financial institution to include securities dealers, travel agencies,
automobile rental companies, pawn brokers, and jewelers. 24 ' As with Section
215 of the USA Patriot Act, persons receiving the letters cannot reveal that
such records have been requested.249 Furthermore, national security letters are
not subject to oversight of the FISA court, instead issuing simply upon the
FBI's certification. 25' As critics have noted, such an expansion allows the
government to obtain any record (not simply financial records as originally
contemplated) from a vast array of businesses about persons who are not
suspected of terrorist activities. 251  Evidence suggests that the FBI has
aggressively used this power.252
In addition to legislative expansion of powers, the Bush administration
also undertook several initiatives to enhance its intelligence-gathering power.
Most significantly, Attorney General Ashcroft revised FBI guidelines
regarding domestic intelligence investigations. The new guidelines specifi-
cally allow the FBI to gather information from a wide variety of sources even
245. For an explanation of the amendments, see Assessing the New Normal, supra note 199, at 17.
246. USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 505(b), 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A); Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2004 § 374, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(d) (West Supp. 2004).
247. USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 505(b), 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A).
248. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 § 374, 12 U.S.C. § 3414(d).
249. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(3).
250. Id § 3414(a)(5)(A).
251. Unpatriotic Acts, supra note 244, at 13; Kim Zetter, Bush Grabs New Power for the FBI, WIRED
NEWS, JAN. 6,2004, available at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0, 1294,61792,00.html (last visited Aug.
14, 2004).
252. An FBI memo obtained by the ACLU reflects that the FBI has used national security letters on
numerous occasions since the 9/11 attacks. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transactional Records NSLs
since 10/26/2001, available at http://www.aclu.org/patriot-foia/FOIA/NSIlists.pdf (last visited Aug. 16,
2004). For further explanation see Press Release, American Civil Uberties Union, Documents Show
Ashcroft is Bypassing Courts With New Spy Powers, ACLU Says (Mar. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=-12166&c=206 (last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
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if it is not engaged in a preliminary or full investigation. They allow FBI
officials to surf the Internet, use commercially available data-mining services,
and attend public meetings held by various organizations in order to gather
information." 3 Ashcroft claimed that such changes were necessary because
the previous guidelines unreasonably restricted the FBI's ability to engage in
lawful surveillance activities. 254 As critics pointed out, however, the FBI was
always able to use data-mining services, the Internet and surveillance of public
meetings when they had some suspicion of potential criminal activity. The
new guidelines allow the FBI to engage in such actions in order to dredge up
possible activity, effectively putting no limits on the FBI's ability to gather
intelligence about lawful political organizations.255 That the new guidelines
substantially lengthen the time for preliminary and full investigations without
significant oversight and expand the FBI's investigative techniques exacer-
bates this problem.2
In the summer of 2002, the Bush administration proposed Operation TIPS
('Terrorism Information and Prevention System").57 Recalling tactics used
during World War I and the Cold War, the program was designed to recruit
average Americans, such as utility workers, postal workers or delivery persons,
to report "suspicious activity" observed while in homes and businesses.5 After
253. The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism
Enterprise Investigations § VI(A)-(B) (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf
(last visited Aug. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Ashcroft Guidelines].
254. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet-Attorney General's Guidelines: Detecting and Preventing
Terrorist Attacks 1, available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/020530ag-guideines.pdf (last
visited Aug. 16, 2004).
255. See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Attorney General's Guidelines, available
at http://www.epic.org/privacy/fbi/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
256. The new guidelines allow preliminary investigations for up 180 days (with two 90 day
extensions) without obtaining approval from FBI headquarters. Ashcroft Guidelines, supra note 253, §
II(B)(3). Previous guidelines allowed only 90 day investigations without prior approval from FBI head-
quarters. See Thornburg Guidelines, supra note 190, § II(B)(3). The new guidelines, while still prohibiting
mail openings and electronic surveillance in preliminary investigations, now permit mail covers, and further
encourage FBI agents to use "any lawful techniques . . . even if intrusive, where the intrusiveness is
warranted in light of the seriousness of the crime. Ashcroft Guidelines, supra, at § I(B)(4). In contrast the
old Guidelines admonished FBI agents to "consider whether information could be obtained in a timely and
effective way by less intrusive means." Thornburg Guidelines, supra, § 11(B)(4). The new guidelines
similarly lengthen the time for full investigations. Compare Ashcroft Guidelines, supra, § lII(B)(4) with
Thornburg Guidelines, supra, § III(B)(4)(b).
257. Dan Eggan, Proposal to Enlist Citizen Spies Was Doomed from Start, WASH. POST, Nov. 24,
2002, at Al1, available at 2002 WL 103571596 (last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
258. Eric Lichtblau, Terrorism Tip Network Scaled Back Surveillance: Workers With Access to
Homes Won't Use New Hotline, Justice Department Says, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, at Al, available at
2002 WL 2495625 (last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
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significant public outcry, however, Congress banned implementation of the
system.259
In November, 2002, the Department of Defense announced another
experimental surveillance initiative, titled "Total Information Awareness."
The program's purpose was to "determine the feasibility of searching vast
quantities of data to determine links and patterns indicative of terrorist
activities., 260 Intended to allow mining of numerous computer databases with
information pertaining to passports, visas, work permits, driver's licenses,
credit cards, airline tickets, rental cars, chemical purchases, and gun pur-
chases,26" ' the program would have provided law enforcement and intelligence
officials with instant access to such information without a search warrant. In
response to public criticism, the Defense Department renamed the project the
"Terrorism Information Awareness" program and replaced the project's
controversial director, Admiral John Poindexter. The program remained in
place until the Senate blocked its funding in October, 2003.262
Other proposed programs have also caused some concern. Critics of the
government's CAPSII program, an airline passenger profiling system designed
to identify individuals connected to international terrorism, argue that it is ill-
defined, allowing airlines to label as security risks people associated with
purely domestic groups, allows information to be shared too freely, and
provides little recourse for individuals who are wrongly labeled.263 Other
observers have noted that, reminiscent of 1960s abuses, military intelligence
is becoming more involved in domestic law enforcement.
264
III. CONCLUSION
What are we to think of the Bush administration's actions in light of the
historical pattern described in Section I? The results of a purely comparative
perspective are mixed. The Bush administration's actions with respect to
control of public information, for example, have yet to reach the level of past
government actions. The government's reliance on direct censorship, propa-
259. 6 U.S.C.A. § 460 (West Supp. 2004).
260. Alexander Cockburn, Total Information, Total Confusion, THE NATION, Dec. 16, 2002, at 9
(quoting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Edward Aldridge), available at 2002 WL 2211090
(last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
261. Id.
262. Robert Block & Gary Fields, Is Military Creeping into Domestic Spying and Enforcement?,
WALL STREET J., Mar. 9, 2004, at B 1, available at 2004 WL 56922304 (last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
263. Assessing the New Normal, supra note 199, at 24-26; Letter from various civil liberties groups
to Congressman Don Young (Feb. 17,2004), available athttp://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040217
cappsii.pdf (listing shortcomings of CAPS H and requesting congressional hearings) (last visited Aug. 16,
2004).
264. Block & Fields, supra note 262.
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ganda, and stigmatization during World War I and the Cold War were far
more onerous and widespread than the current administration's. This is not
to imply that the Bush administration's attempts to criminalize certain forms
of expression or to coerce public sentiment are without problems. But they
have not yet been applied in as widespread or arbitrary a manner as past
incidents.
The Bush administration's actions regarding surveillance are harder to
assess as there is little available information regarding the administration's
actual use of them. Certainly, however, the administration has proposed
intrusive surveillance operations, including enlistment of public citizens-a
situation that caused much abuse in past incidents. Moreover, evolving
technology allows potentially far-reaching surveillance operations unlike
anything seen during past crises. The lack of enforceable legal restrictions on
such surveillance, combined with the government's roll back of voluntary
restrictions resulting from past reform efforts, cause additional concern.
The Bush administration's actions with respect to secrecy are of great
concern. Numerous commentators have noted that the Bush administration's
"penchant for secrecy" exceeds any past administrations.'265 Far more
information, including routine material, has been withheld from public
disclosure out of "national security" concerns. The administration's attempts
to blockade public access to information are as or more vigorous than any
previous administrations'. The Bush administration's actions are more
worrisome as its secrecy is the primary source of difficultly in assessing the
administration's intelligence-gathering activities, a power historically subject
to abuse.
This relationship between the Bush administration's secrecy and its
potential abuse of intelligence activities highlights a significant point regard-
ing the government's tools of information control. Although we tend to think
of and discuss these tools separately, historically they compliment one another
in a way that often leads to abuse. The FBI's abuse of its intelligence-gather-
ing power, for example, could not have occurred without control of confiden-
tial and public information. Secrecy associated with the "national security"
rationale extended far beyond issues of legitimately classified information, to
become a "culture of secrecy"266 that protected many government actions from
scrutiny, including the FBI's extensive surveillance network. That "culture
of secrecy" was either accepted or unquestioned because the government
controlled public information by (1) engaging in extensive propaganda
265. See, e.g., David E. Rosenbaum, The World: Top Secret; When Government Doesn't Tell, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, § 4, at 1; Mark Tapscott, Editorial, Too Many Secrets, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2002,
at A25, available at 2002 WL 102573378 (last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
266. Secrecy Report, supra note 1, at A41-A63.
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campaigns regarding the FBI's important mission,267 or (2) stigmatizing
individuals with different views essentially coercing them into silence. 26' The
government also controlled public information by selectively leaking
information it found helpful for the public to know and burying or punishing
publication of information under a "national security" rationale that detracted
from its actions. 269 Thus, the FBI's illegal intelligence-gathering continued
because Hoover had firm control over all levels of information. That the Bush
administration also apparently desires to control all levels of information is
cause for concern in light of past events.
This concern is not allayed by the fact that some of the Bush adminis-
tration' s expanded powers are not yet as expansive as in the past or are merely
small incremental changes to already-existing powers. The historical pattern
of information control and abuse described above rarely resulted from radical
changes in government practices. Rather, abuse of government power usually
resulted from incremental change. Excessive secrecy in the name of national
security came about as a result of incremental changes in executive orders and
administration practice. The government's abuse of surveillance reflected an
ebb and flow, with government officials extending their power too far,
retrenching, and then slowly expanding again over time. That such change is
incremental is precisely why it is so dangerous.
The practice of implementing small changes all tending towards secrecy,
instead of taking dramatic steps to restrain access, makes it harder to evaluate
the impact and, indeed, to fight the changes. It is, undoubtedly, more difficult
to garner public support for opposition to minor changes when more pressing
issues, like an impending war, are competing for public attention.27 °
Thus, it behooves the public to pay attention to even the smallest changes in
government power.
The Bush administration's fight against terrorism and other national
security threats is sure to be ongoing, as it evolves, so too will the tools it
employs. In order to protect against the abuse so often historically present, the
public must watch both the larger pattern of information control and its
evolution.
267. DONNER, supra note 103, at 90-96.
268. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
269. For a general discussion of this phenomenon, see White, supra note 215, at 1100.
270. National Security Archive, The Ashcroft Memo, supra note 205, at 28.
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